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ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the rise of “co-religionist commerce” in the
United States—that is, the explosion of commercial dealings that take
place between co-religionists who intend their transactions to achieve
both commercial and religious objectives. To remain viable, coreligionist commerce requires all the legal support necessary to sustain
all other commercial relationships. Contracts must be enforced,
parties must be protected against torts, and disputes must be reliably
adjudicated.
Under current constitutional doctrine, co-religionist commercial
agreements must be translated into secular terminology if they are to
be judicially enforced. But many religious goods and services cannot
be accurately translated without religious terms and structures. To
address this translation problem, courts could make use of contextual
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tools of contract interpretation, thereby providing the necessary
evidence to give meaning to co-religionist commercial agreements.
However, contextual approaches to co-religionist commerce have
been undermined by two current legal trends—one in constitutional
law, the other in commercial law. The first is New Formalism, which
discourages courts from looking to customary norms and relational
principles to interpret commercial instruments. The second is what we
call Establishment Clause Creep, which describes a growing judicial
reticence to adjudicate disputes situated within a religious context.
Together, these two legal developments prevent courts from using
context to interpret and enforce co-religionist commercial agreements.
This Article proposes that courts preserve co-religionist commerce
with a limited embrace of contextualism. A thorough inquiry into
context, which is discouraged by both New Formalist and many
Establishment Clause doctrines, would allow courts to surmise
parties’ intents and distinguish commercial from religious substance.
Empowering the intent of co-religionist parties and limiting the
doctrinal developments that threaten to undermine co-religionist
commerce can secure marketplace dealings without intruding upon
personal faith.
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INTRODUCTION
Though a rich tradition warns that mixing religion and money
1
corrupts both, there is a great deal of “co-religionist commerce” in
America—that is, commerce between co-religionists who intend their
transactions to adhere to religious principles or to pursue religious
2
objectives. Prominent examples of co-religionist commerce in the
3
United States include a $4.6 billion Christian-products industry, a
4
$12.5 billion kosher-food market, and a growing share of an $800
5
billion global Sharia-compliant finance market.
In recent years, American religious communities have become
increasingly sophisticated players in commercial markets, developing
legal instruments that comply with the demands of religious dictates

1. Consider, as a historical and literary example, the following exchange between the
farmer John Proctor and Reverend John Hale:
Hale: I note that you are rarely in the church on Sabbath Day. . . . Will you tell me
why you are so absent? . . .
Proctor: I surely did come when I could, and when I could not I prayed in this house.
Hale: Mr. Proctor, your house is not a church; your theology must tell you that.
Proctor: It does, sir, it does; and it tells me that a minister may pray to God without
he have golden candlesticks upon the altar.
Hale: What golden candlesticks?
Proctor: Since we built the church there were pewter candlesticks upon the altar;
Francis Nurse made them, y’know, and a sweeter hand never touched the metal. But
[Reverend] Parris came, and for twenty week he preach nothin’ but golden
candlesticks until he had them. I labor the earth from dawn of day to blink of night,
and I tell you true, when I look to heaven and see my money glaring at his elbows—it
hurt my prayer, sir, it hurt my prayer.
ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 64–65 (Penguin Books 1981) (1952).
2. See, e.g., William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious
Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 315 (1986) (“[O]rganized
religion represents an increasingly pervasive force in all elements of the society, including
politics, commercial enterprise, and social welfare.”); Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in
Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 912 (2009) (“In many—and perhaps an increasing
number of—instances, religion overlaps with the commercial sphere and courts are obligated to
determine whether or not to adopt an entirely hands-off approach simply because the specter of
religion lurks on the horizon.”).
3. See, e.g., Jay Reeves, Some in $4.6B Christian Industry Copy Designs, Logos, USA
TODAY, Dec. 18, 2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2009-12-18-christiancopyright_N.htm; Christian Product Sales Put at $4 Billion Plus, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2001,
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jul/07/local/me-19488; see also Andrew Stone Mayo, Comment,
For God and Money: The Place of the Megachurch Within the Bankruptcy Code, 27 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 609, 620–22 (2011) (describing the market for “quasi-religious products and
services” and noting the existence of a $4.6 billion Christian-products industry).
4. See KOSHERFEST, KOSHER INDUSTRY FACTS, http://www.kosherfest.com/kosher-facts
(last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
5. Scott R. Anderson, Recent Development: Forthcoming Changes in the Shari’ah
Compliance Regime for Islamic Finance, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 237, 237 (2010).
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while engineering substantial business transactions. Religious
institutions have adopted employment agreements and arbitration
7
systems that reflect substantive religious objectives, houses of
worship have provided their constituents with a growing array of
8
commercial services, and businesses have drafted increasingly
6. See, e.g., Martin M. Shenkman, Integrating Religious Considerations into Estate and
Real Estate Planning, 22 PROB. & PROP. 34 (2008) (suggesting practical financial-structuring and
contract-drafting adaptations to account for religious parties).
7. See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2006)
(affirming the dismissal of an employment discrimination suit by a music director on the
grounds that the music director served a ministerial function within the church); AliceaHernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming the dismissal
of an employment discrimination suit by a press secretary on the grounds that the secretary
served a ministerial function within the church); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Roman
Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 802–03 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming the dismissal of an
employment discrimination suit by a music director on the grounds that the music director
served a ministerial function within the church); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 177 (5th Cir.
1999) (affirming the dismissal of an employment discrimination suit by a choir director on the
grounds that the choir director served a ministerial function within the church); Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dismissing the
case on Establishment Clause grounds because a court evaluation of the professor’s
qualifications to teach Canon law would be impermissibly intrusive); Scharon v. St. Luke’s
Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming the dismissal of an
employment discrimination suit by a former chaplain against a religious hospital in order to
avoid excessive interference with religion in violation of the First Amendment); Nevius v. Afr.
Inland Mission Int’l, 511 F. Supp. 2d 114, 120 (D.D.C. 2007) (dismissing a missionary’s
discrimination claim against a missionary organization in order to avoid venturing into an
“ecclesiastical dispute”); Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Ga.
2007) (dismissing a § 1981 claim by the director of the “worship arts” department against a
church because the director’s function had been a ministerial one within the church); Hartwig v.
Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D. Conn. 2000) (dismissing claims by a
professor at a Catholic college on Establishment Clause grounds to avoid becoming entangled
in religious matters); El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Ark. 2006) (affirming a summary
judgment against an Islamic minister because resolution of his claims would involve deciding
ecclesiastical issues); McEnroy v. St. Meinrad Sch. of Theology, 713 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999) (affirming the dismissal of a seminary professor’s claims in order to avoid excessive
entanglement in religious affairs); Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 2011-CA-000004MR, 2012 WL 3046472 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 426 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2014) (reversing a grant
of summary judgment against a tenured professor for breach of contract claims against a
seminary because the professor was not a ministerial employee of the seminary); Kirby v.
Lexington Theological Seminary, 2010-CA-001798-MR, 2012 WL 3046352 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012),
rev’d, 426 S.W.3d 597 (Ky. 2014) (reversing a grant of summary judgment against another
seminary professor in materially similar circumstances); Fisher v. Congregation B’nai Yitzhok,
110 A.2d 881, 883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (affirming a ruling for a rabbi-cantor on a breach of
contract case because the legal issue did not involve religious matters but rather the intent of the
parties).
8. See, e.g., Bobby Allyn, Nashville Megachurch Appeals Tax Break Ruling over
Bookstore, Cafe, THE TENNESSEAN, Nov. 15, 2012, http://www.tennessean.com/article/
20121115/NEWS06/311150008/Nashville-megachurch-appeals-tax-break-ruling-over-bookstorecafe (noting that Christ Church in Nashville, Tennessee, has “a gym, bookstore, and cafe on its
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complex and creative legal documents to ensure compliance with
religious standards. Co-religionist commerce is not just big business, it
is also a sophisticated practice of law. And like any other modern
industry, co-religionist commerce and its legal framework rely heavily
on the formal legal support—enforcement of contracts, protection
against torts, and adjudication of disputes—that is necessary to
sustain all commercial arrangements.
Because of its ecclesiastical qualities, however, co-religionist
commerce presents an unusual challenge to American law. When
commercial disputes arise among co-religionists, courts are asked—
for example, in determining the parties’ intents or customary norms—
9
to interpret religious terminology, standards, and practices. Courts
therefore often shy away from adjudicating co-religionist commercial
disputes, fearing that intervention would impermissibly contravene
10
prevailing interpretations of the Establishment Clause. Yet courts
also recognize that refusing to issue rulings both abdicates the judicial
11
responsibility to resolve legal disputes and withdraws the legal
property”); Jesse Bogan, America’s Biggest Megachurches, FORBES (June 26, 2009), available at
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/26/americas-biggest-megachurches-business-megachurches.html
(noting that the Second Baptist Church of Houston, Texas, has “fitness centers, bookstores,
information desks, a café, a K-12 school, and free automotive repair service for single
mothers”).
9. See, e.g., Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial
Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 520 (2005)
(collecting cases); Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 514–17 (2013)
(same); Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 259 n.115, 260 n.116 (2000) (same).
10. Although the reasons for this constitutional restriction vary, most scholarly treatments
contend that the Establishment Clause erects structural or jurisdictional barriers to courts’
ability to interfere with the authority of religious institutions to govern religious life. See, e.g.,
Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84
IOWA L. REV. 1, 5–6, 75 (1998); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious
Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 851–52 (2009); Andrew
Koppelman, The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
865, 869 (2009); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes
Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 120 (2007).
11. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1021, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(holding that the use of neutral principles of law to enforce a ketubah advanced the secular
purposes of enabling parties to enter contracts and promoting the “amicable settlement of
disputes that have arisen between parties to marriage”); cf. Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the
Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378, 1382–83,
1410–12 (1981) (emphasizing the burdens on religious institutions when courts refuse to
embrace their traditional dispute-resolution function); Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Resolution of
Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 513, 515 (1990) (noting
that “a strong policy favoring dispute settlement and the protection of civil interests mandates
civil court intervention in [religious disputes]”).
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infrastructure that is routinely available to—and necessary to
12
support—secular commerce. Constitutional doctrine has long
recognized this challenge and has instructed courts, when confronted
with disputes that are imbued with ecclesiastical circumstances, to
adjudicate on the basis of “neutral principles of law”—that is, to issue
rulings based “on objective, well-established concepts of [] law
13
familiar to lawyers and judges.” Relying on neutral principles of law
allows courts to resolve disputes among co-religionists while avoiding
“entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and
14
practice.”
Unfortunately, the neutral-principles framework has proven less
successful than participants in co-religionist commercial markets
might have hoped. The core problem lies in a translation difficulty.
Parties to co-religionist commercial agreements often lack the
flexibility to replace religious terms in their agreements with secular
terms, and therefore cannot contract around the Establishment
15
Clause. For example, parties entering into purchase agreements for
kosher food or into employment agreements for ministers seek a
certain type of religious product or service that cannot be described
without reference to religious requirements or religious standards. In
other instances, co-religionist commercial agreements cannot be
12. Advocates of broader First Amendment protection for religious institutions have long
worried that regulating religious institutions purely as commercial actors requires casting off
religious commitments as the price of admission to the commercial and financial markets. See,
e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 369, 397–99 (2013). These concerns might even provide good reason to rethink
some widely held constitutional commitments, including constitutional objections to judicial
resolution of religious questions. See generally, e.g., Helfand, supra note 9 (arguing that courts
should not abstain from resolving disputes that turn on religious doctrine or practice when no
other institution has authority to resolve the dispute). For other critiques of the religious
question doctrine, see Goldstein, supra note 9, at 525–33 (providing examples of certain judicial
determinations that necessarily involve religion and asserting that it is neither possible nor
desirable to adopt an absolute prohibition on the “judicial assessment of religious questions”);
Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of
Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 123 (1997) (examining the harms that
may result from judicial unwillingness to inquire into religious practices in Establishment Clause
cases).
13. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 11, at 1409–10 (arguing that the neutral-principles
approach limits judicial inquiry in ways that undermine a court’s ability to reach a justifiable
outcome); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1884–85 (1998) (worrying that the neutral-principles
approach can lead to outcomes that “are likely to diverge from the actual understandings of
those concerned”).
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modified from their traditional form if they are to have their desired
16
religious effect. For example, religious marriage contracts—such as
17
18
the mahr in Muslim marriages or the ketubah in Jewish marriages —
often assign financial commitments through the use of religious
references. But assigning these obligations with purely secular
terminology would undermine the religious significance of the
marriage ceremony.
This translation problem need not foreclose the possibility of
predictable and enforceable co-religionist commercial transactions.
Courts do, on occasion, embrace a contextual approach to
understanding ecclesiastical terms within a neutral framework. This
flexible interpretive approach can secure religious commercial
transactions, even as it sometimes requires delving into customary
norms to extract commercial substance from religious principles or
permitting evidence from religious authorities to translate
ecclesiastical terms into secular language.
Employing contextualism as a response to the translation
problem, however, has been stymied by two doctrinal
developments—one in commercial law and the other in constitutional
law. In commercial law, a subjective or contextual approach to
understanding co-religionist commercial disputes has been
discouraged by what private-law scholars have called New
19
Formalism. New Formalism refers to trends in court decisions and
legal scholarship that increasingly advocate textual interpretations of
contracts between merchants. A reaction to Karl Llewellyn’s and the
Uniform Commercial Code’s (UCC’s) embrace of business customs
and general good-faith standards, New Formalism urges courts to
refrain from inquiring into contextual elements—such as customary
norms, notions of equity, and relational principles—when interpreting
and enforcing contractual arrangements. In turn, New Formalism
restricts courts from inquiring into the subjective intent of parties or
extrinsic evidence that might inform the contracting environment
20
between parties. Under such a New Formalist framework, courts
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra notes 109–19 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842
(1999).
20. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1807–08 (1996) (arguing that
contextualist interpretation prevents parties from contracting according to their “preferred mix
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cannot invoke contextual evidence to interpret religious terminology
21
in co-religionist commercial agreements.
And in constitutional law, courts have exhibited a growing
wariness of adjudicating disputes that involve, even tangentially,
ecclesiastical interests. This has led to what this Article refers to as
“Establishment Clause Creep,” a growing tendency by courts to
interpret the Establishment Clause expansively to preclude
adjudication of co-religionist disputes that, at their core, are
commercial in nature. In such instances, courts conflate the
commercial objectives of a transaction with the religious
22
commitments of the parties, thereby undermining the core
commitments of the neutral-principles approach to co-religionist
23
commerce. When courts refuse to adjudicate co-religionist disputes,
24
25
damages flowing from commercial fraud, professional defamation,
26
and contractual breach are left unremedied.

of legal and extralegal terms” and deters them from “flexibly adjust[ing] their contracting
relationships”); Charny, supra note 19, at 846–48 (observing that the new formalist rejects
evidence of custom because of “the radical institutional and transactional specificity of
transactional norms”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 587 (2003) (arguing that contextualist interpretation can
create moral hazard).
21. See sources cited supra note 20.
22. Michael A. Helfand, Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial
Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 159 (2011) (observing that courts often refuse to
adjudicate certain religious cases due to “a hypersensitivity to entanglement concerns” with
religion, not because of any “require[d] dismissal on Establishment Clause grounds”).
23. Given this trend, it is not surprising that the neutral-principles approach has been
exposed to some significant criticism. Some have criticized the neutral-principles doctrine on the
ground that it is insufficiently attentive to the sovereignty of religious institutions over their own
religious matters. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church
Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1294–97
(1980); Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 969
(1991); John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of
the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 863–68 (1984). Others have worried that the neutralprinciples doctrine requires courts to consider only the neutral features of the case—a tactic that
may lead to errors in adjudicating disputes. See Ellman, supra note 11, at 1409–10 (criticizing the
neutral-principles doctrine); Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1881–1907 (arguing that although the
neutral-principles approach has many advantages, it can in some cases lead courts to issue
decisions that “may not match” the intentions of the parties).
24. In late 2012, this issue became the subject of litigation with allegations that Hebrew
National failed to conform its meat to its advertised kosher standards. See Wallace v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, Wallace v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2014); Tiffany Tsu, Suit Says Hebrew National Isn’t Kosher;
ConAgra Says Without Merit, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/20/
business/la-fi-mo-hebrew-national-con-agra-20120620.
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Together, New Formalism and Establishment Clause Creep form
the Scylla and Charybdis of co-religionist commerce. On the one
hand, New Formalism requires parties to use explicit language, but on
the other hand, Establishment Clause Creep causes courts to
withdraw whenever a dispute implicates, even tangentially, an
ecclesiastic issue. Co-religionists are unable to characterize their
dispute in either implied or explicit terms.
The combination of these two doctrinal trends has denied coreligionists the institutional support that is available to other
27
merchants. The most significant result has been that co-religionists
have had great difficulty drafting contracts that both accurately
capture their commercial intent and contain language that is
ultimately enforceable in court. But the doctrinal combination also
exposes co-religionists to tortious economic harm because economic
torts between co-religionists—including antitrust disputes—also
involve a commingling of neutral principles with religious context. By
removing the efficiencies typically gained by having courts secure
contract and property rights and protect parties from tortious harm,
these doctrinal developments generate substantial economic costs.
And by imposing a unique economic burden on religious conduct,
these developments also do injury to religious liberties.
Indeed, these fundamental challenges to co-religionist commerce
are even more concerning because co-religionist commerce is a
28
growth industry.
Continued globalization of commercial
29
30
relationships and America’s changing demographics all but

This litigation is far from the first time that kosher standards have served as the
foundation for a legal suit. See, e.g., Cohen v. Eisenberg, 19 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1940) (determining the plaintiff’s poultry trade to have been kosher, and in turn, finding the
defendant’s public proclamation that the plaintiff’s poultry trade was not kosher to have been
defamatory), aff’d, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1940).
25. Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D. Conn. 2000); Abdelhak
v. Jewish Press, 985 A.2d 197, 207–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (finding that inquiry into
the nexus between a defamatory statement and damages would require impermissible
investigation of religious doctrine).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
29. Faisal Kutty, The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration, 28 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 565, 565 (2006) (“In addition to issues in interpretation of commercial
agreements and practices, differences in custom, language, culture, and religion continue to fuel
conflicts and disagreements between commercial players.”).
30. Especially given the importance of Sharia-compliant finance to the global commercial
markets, see Anderson, supra note 5, at 237, it is worth noting that some projections predict that
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guarantee that co-religionist commerce will continue to represent a
growing share of the nation’s economy. Moreover, these commercial
trends are expanding at exactly the moment when tensions between
religious exercise and commercial objectives stand at the center of
some of the most foundational church–state debates in the United
States. For example, the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna31
Tabor v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ruled that the
First Amendment shields religious institutions from liability under
32
certain antidiscrimination laws. That same year, the Supreme Court
of New Mexico imposed liability under the state’s publicaccommodations law on a photographer who, citing her religious
commitments, refused to provide her professional photography
33
services at a same-sex marriage. Perhaps most significantly, on the
final day of the 2014–15 term, the Supreme Court held in Burwell v.
34
Hobby Lobby that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act
35
affords protection to closely held for-profit corporations.
Consequently, certain religiously motivated corporations need not
36
comply with the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception mandate”

the Muslim population in the United States will more than double in the next two decades. See
The Future of the Global Muslim Population, PEW F. ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Jan. 2011),
available
at
http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Muslim/
FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF-Feb10.pdf.
31. Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
32. See id. at 705 (noting uniform acceptance of the ministerial exception by federal courts
of appeals).
33. See Robert K. Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good, 49 J. CATH. LEG. STUD.
293, 305 (2010) (quoting Chai Feldblum, a member of the EEOC, as saying, “If you run a
wedding photography service, even if you don’t like the fact that those two ex-gays are getting
married, you’d better have someone on your staff who will take those pictures.”); Robert K.
Vischer, How Necessary is the Right of Assembly?, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2012)
(critiquing the view “that the owners of Elane Photography can honor their consciences by
keeping their moral beliefs out of the marketplace” because it “ignores the external orientation
of conscience”); see generally ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD:
RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010) (discussing the facts of the case
generally and observing that “both sides in the Elane Photography case [could] wrap themselves
in the mantle of conscience,” notwithstanding the outcome); Nadia N. Sawicki, The Hollow
Promise of Freedom of Conscience, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1389, 1426 (2012) (noting that
“[n]umerous business owners in California and elsewhere (including medical providers,
websites, event venues, photographers, landlords, and civil servants) have refused to provide
services to gay couples on the basis of moral objections to homosexuality,” and collecting
relevant cases).
34. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
35. Id. at 2772–73.
36. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2015) (requiring employers that provide health insurance to
include coverage for contraception and other related preventative care).
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when doing so would violate the religious conscience of those who
37
own the corporation.
All of these cases involve parties that both engage in commercial
conduct and profess religious commitments, and they highlight how
the unique statutory and constitutional treatment of religion can
inadvertently undermine the security of voluntary commercial
relationships. Therefore, viewing these cases in relation to coreligionist commerce both reveals how impactful these cases can be
on significant areas of commerce and suggests how critical it is for the
law to be able to distinguish between the blurred categories of
commerce and religion.
This Article argues that courts should recognize the unique
challenges of co-religionist commerce and should appreciate how the
dual effects of New Formalism and Establishment Clause Creep
contravene parties’ intents and undermine growing commercial
markets. Part I focuses on the root of the legal conundrum by
examining the “translation problem” and how it poses a unique
challenge to the neutral-principles framework. Parts II and III then
identify the emerging trends of New Formalism and Establishment
Clause Creep and explain how they constitute a dual threat to coreligionist commerce. Part IV then outlines a path for limited
contextualism that can support co-religionist commerce while making
better use of the neutral-principles doctrine and enabling parties to
engage in the commercial dealings they desire.
I. THE TRANSLATION PROBLEM
The neutral-principles framework was born out of the Supreme
38
Court’s attempt to successfully navigate a complex balancing act.
The Court hoped to preserve the judiciary’s obligation to resolve
disputes between co-religionists without impermissibly resolving
39
religious questions. To navigate this delicate balance, the Court

37. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2772–73.
38. For some recent analysis of the neutral-principles framework, see Idleman, supra note
9, at 259; Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 589, 607–11 (2000); Calvin Massey, Church Schisms, Church Property, and Civil
Authority, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 23, 50 (2010); Brian Schmalzbach, Note, Confusion and
Coercion in Church Property Litigation, 96 VA. L. REV. 443, 447, 450 (2010).
39. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (“The primary advantages of the neutralprinciples approach are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity.”).
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encouraged participants in co-religionist commercial markets to
translate their agreements, replacing religious terminology with
secular analogs. The Court emphasized, in the context of churchproperty disputes, that “[s]tates, religious organizations, and
individuals must structure relationships involving church property so
40
as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”
And more generally, the Court assured parties that their co-religionist
commercial dealings would be supported and enforced so long as the
questions presented would “rel[y] exclusively on objective, well41
established concepts of . . . law familiar to lawyers and judges.”
Thus, the Supreme Court committed itself to neutral principles
of law presuming that parties can and would structure their legal
dealings in secular language to avoid Establishment Clause
42
problems. In this way, the neutral-principles framework leveraged
what the Supreme Court called “the peculiar genius of private-law
systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and
43
obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.” It relied on the
dynamism of private law—and particularly of drafting contracts—that
empowers parties to adjust to legal parameters and craft their
44
dealings within the shadow of the law. This presumption—that
Scholars continue to debate the precise Establishment Clause worry implicated when
courts resolve religious questions. See Esbeck, supra note 10, at 5–6 (arguing that the
Establishment Clause creates a structural restraint on courts, which divests them of jurisdiction
to resolve religious questions); Garnett, supra note 10, at 862–63 (linking the prohibition against
judicial resolution of religious questions to the autonomy of religious institutions); Koppelman,
supra note 10, at 883 (arguing that judicial intervention in religious questions corrupts religion);
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 122–23 (arguing that courts are adjudicatively disabled from
resolving religious questions). But see Helfand, supra note 9, at 520 (arguing that the religious
question doctrine stems from a misunderstanding of Establishment Clause principles).
40. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
41. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603.
42. Id. (“Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societies
can specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a particular contingency, or
what religious body will determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal
controversy.”).
43. Id.
44. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1743, 1762 (2000) (discussing how contract-law principles have responded to the multifaceted
and “moving stream of events that precedes, follows, or constitutes the formation of a
contract”); Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and Interpretation Rules: The
Need for A Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. L. REV. 506, 531 (2005)
(commenting on how contract-law objectives demand consideration of the evolving business
and social norms and needs that underlie the formation of contracts shaped by regional,
cultural, and linguistic assumptions between parties).
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parties can deftly respond to doctrinal constraints —stands at the
46
very epicenter of the Supreme Court’s neutral-principles project and
sustains the belief that courts can remain true to First Amendment
values without abdicating their foundational dispute-resolution
47
responsibilities.

45. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1506 (1998) (discussing how parties will adapt their
behavior to changing rules of law in accordance with their economic priorities); Ariel Porat,
Enforcing Contracts in Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship Between Public and
Private Orders, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2465–66, 2478 (2000) (noting that the formation of
contracts will reflect the conditions of the public order, including the courts’ rules of contract
interpretation); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial
Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 771 (2000); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of
Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1584 (2005) (discussing the implications of how
different modes of contract interpretation will move parties to responsively negotiate contract
terms in a manner that maximizes their own economic interests).
46. See, e.g., Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603 (“Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust
provisions, religious societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a
particular contingency, or what religious body will determine the ownership in the event of a
schism or doctrinal controversy.”); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“Hence, States, religious organizations,
and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the
civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”).
47. See Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1715, 1743 (noting that
the neutral-principles approach is contingent on “whether private ordering through instruments
such as deeds and trusts can in particular instances effectively translate religious principles into
enforceable secular norms”); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular
and Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 357 (1986) (“[The neutral-principles
approach] assumes that the church has translated into familiar secular terminology its
organizational characteristics, no matter how secular or alien they may be.”).
To be sure, scholars have vigorously debated the utility of the neutral-principles
approach ever since the Court announced its decision in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). For
some, the notion that courts would now be given free entry into the life of religious
institutions—free to regulate so long as they could avoid engaging religious doctrine or
practice—undermined the core commitment to religious institutional freedom expressed in
many of the Supreme Court’s prior decisions. See Dane, supra note 23, at 969 (“The problem
with [the neutral-principles approach] . . . is that it too denies the collective, self-defining
character of true legal orders. It treats religious autonomy as a negative freedom—the right not
to have secular courts decide religious orthodoxy. But it ignores the positive side of autonomy,
the right to define, and to enforce, legal rubrics and rights apart from those provided by the
secular state.”).
Meanwhile, others worried that there would be something lost in the translation of
religious commitments into secular terminology, raising the possibility that courts might
misinterpret the nature of the intended legal obligations between the parties. See, e.g., Ellman,
supra note 11, at 1409–10 (arguing that the neutral-principles approach limits judicial inquiry in
ways that undermine a court’s ability to reach a justifiable outcome); Greenawalt, supra note 15,
at 1884–85 (1998) (worrying that the neutral-principles approach can lead to outcomes that “are
likely to diverge from the actual understandings of those concerned”).
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Many religious objectives cannot be captured in alternative
secular terminology, however, and thus many co-religionist
48
commercial instruments resist translation. One reason for this
“translation problem” is that parties enter co-religionist commercial
arrangements to purchase religious goods or secure religious
performance, but these religious goods and services are often not
susceptible to description in secular terminology. Frequent examples
49
include the contractual obligations of a minister, or the religious
50
standards for supervising kosher products. In drafting such
agreements, parties aim to create commercial or financial
arrangements that will comport with shared religious rules and values.
Reference to specific religious terms is essential to the agreement. To
use the above examples, a party seeking to ensure that he is
purchasing kosher food cannot translate that requirement into secular
51
terminology; and a congregation that retains the contractual right to
terminate a minister for “cause” cannot incorporate secular
terminology that captures the religious standards of conduct expected
52
within the given religious community. Such contractual expectations
are not just too multifarious to be contractually memorialized, but
they incorporate by reference religious rules and values that are
53
inherently religious and therefore lack secular analogs.
48. See Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1881–1907 (arguing that although the neutralprinciples approach has many advantages, it can in some cases lead courts to issue decisions that
“may not match” the intentions of the parties).
49. See, e.g., Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace Church, No. 01-CV-7871,
2004 WL 540327, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2004) (holding that the court could not decide
whether the plaintiff was rightfully terminated for cause, as such a determination would run
afoul of First Amendment considerations); El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 793 (Ark. 2006)
(dismissing an imam’s breach-of-employment-contract claim for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction because the cause for termination included claims that the imam’s “misconduct
‘contradicts the Islamic law’”).
50. See, e.g., Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 419 (2d Cir.
2002) (considering the constitutionality of the state’s “kosher law”); Barghout v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 833 F. Supp. 540, 542 (D. Md. 1993) (same); Ran-Dav’s Cnty. Kosher, Inc. v. State,
608 A.2d 1353, 1355 (N.J. 1992) (same).
51. See cases cited supra note 49.
52. See Wallace v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 995, 999–1000 (D. Minn. 2013)
(dismissing a lawsuit claiming the defendant falsely advertised its food was “100% kosher”
because resolving the dispute would violate First Amendment principles), rev’d on other
grounds, Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025, 1033 (8th Cir. 2014); see also cases
cited supra note 50.
53. See Sirico, supra note 47, at 357 (criticizing the neutral-principles approach “because it
assumes that selectively culled provisions accurately reflect the expectations of the parties [and]
. . . thus permits dispute resolution only by positing an artificial formalism on the church’s
part”).
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A second reason parties to co-religionist commercial agreements
lack the ability to modify their agreements is that their religious
traditions and doctrines place formal restrictions on the structure and
54
terms of the relevant documents. Examples of this dynamic arise
regularly in the family-law context, particularly in cases of marriage
55
56
and divorce. Within Jewish and Islamic communities, traditional

One way to address this issue might be to increase the use of religious arbitration. Once
a co-religionist commercial dispute is submitted to a religious-arbitration tribunal, the
arbitrators could resolve the dispute by exploring religious questions, given that there is no
constitutional prohibition against arbitrators investigating such religious questions. See Helfand,
supra note 9, at 506–09 (describing the gap-filling role of religious arbitration). Although
religious arbitration mitigates this translation problem somewhat because the arbitrators can
interpret and enforce religious terminology, it is an insufficient mechanism to solve the problem
for a number of reasons. First, not all religious communities have access to religious-arbitration
tribunals capable of addressing complex claims of co-religionist commerce. See, e.g., Michael A.
Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal
Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1249–52 (2011) (discussing the lag in the development of
Islamic arbitration tribunals in the United States). Second, and relatedly, even when a religious
community maintains religious tribunals, not all members of the religious community will have
access to religious tribunals that align with their own denominational and theological
affiliations. And third, courts sometimes refuse to enforce arbitration provisions that attempt to
authorize religious tribunals to resolve a dispute precisely because they use religious
terminology to ensure that the forum selected and law chosen will track the intentions of the
parties. See, e.g., Sieger v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104 (App. Div. 2002) (refusing on First
Amendment grounds to enforce a purported arbitration provision that required a dispute to be
resolved “in accordance with the ‘regulations of Speyer, Worms, and Mainz’”); In re Ismailoff,
14 Misc. 3d 1229(A) (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Feb. 1, 2007) (refusing to enforce an arbitration provision
that required the selection of “three persons of the Orthodox Jewish faith”).
54. See infra Part II.B.
55. See, e.g., Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899, 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); In re Scholl, 621 A.2d
808, 811 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1992); Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1996); Mayer-Kolker v. Kolker, 819 A.2d 17, 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); Minkin v.
Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981); see generally Alan C. Lazerow, Give
and “Get”? Applying the Restatement of Contracts to Determine the Enforceability of Get
Settlement Contracts, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 103 (2009) (discussing the nature and enforceability of
Jewish bill-of-divorce contracts).
56. Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); see also Soleimani
v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 (Dist. Ct. Kan. Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/09/soleimani.pdf (discussing Establishment Clause concerns
preventing the interpretation of a mahr agreement); Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 490–91
(Md. 2008); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1002 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Zawahiri
v. Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *5–6 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008); Ahmad v.
Ahmad, No. L-00-1391, 2001 WL 1518116, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001).
This apparent increase in mahr cases has also spawned a number of recent articles. See,
e.g., Nathan B. Oman, Bargaining in the Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and the
Perils of Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 580 (2010) [hereinafter Oman,
Bargaining]; Nathan B. Oman, How to Judge Shari’a Contracts: A Guide to Islamic Marriage
Agreements in American Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 287, 290 (2011) [hereinafter Oman, How to
Judge]; Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts:
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marriage ceremonies require the couple not only to execute religious
documents that have important symbolic and religious value, but also
to include provisions in those documents that assign financial
57
obligations between the couple. Some couples may, of course, fully
understand and embrace both the symbolic and financial aspects of
these agreements; others may sign them simply to conform to
58
longstanding family traditions. But the limitations placed by
religious doctrine on the form and substance of these documents
prevent the parties from ensuring that the terms of their co-religionist
commercial agreements reflect the precise intentions of the parties.
The inherent obstacles to translating religious obligations into
secular terminology have long served as a fundamental critique to the
59
Supreme Court’s neutral-principles approach.
The doctrine
presumes that religious parties can incorporate purely ecclesiastical
customs, words, and documents into neutral language. Put another
way, it presumes that parties can use secular language to represent
religious intents that are beyond what is apparent to the objective
observer. Thus, the neutral-principles approach presents a classic
challenge in legal interpretation, pitting objective methods against
subjective intents.
This inherent disconnect between the parties’ subjective
intentions and the need to use secular language causes predictable
problems. Factfinders, for example, are likely to make interpretation
errors, either perceiving an instrument that represents symbolic and
ecclesiastical value to be purely commercial, or interpreting
intentionally commercial terms to have unintended ecclesiastical
meaning. As a result, these translation challenges are more than mere
inconveniences, as they strike at core features of interpretation. They
pose a direct challenge to the motivation underlying the neutralprinciples approach, which the Supreme Court designed so that courts

Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptuals and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L.
REV. 189, 191 (2002); Charles P. Trumbull, Note, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for
Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 609, 611 (2006).
57. See Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63
MD. L. REV. 540, 540 (2004); see generally MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL
CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION
(Joel Nichols ed., 2012) (discussing the intersection of religion and civil society in marriage).
58. See, e.g., In re the Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787, 791 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
59. See supra notes 47–48.
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can interpret and enforce co-religionist commercial agreements to
60
“reflect the intentions of the parties.”
One way to avoid the translation problem is to take the Supreme
Court at its word and, irrespective of interpretive canons, place a
61
greater primacy on determining the “intentions of the parties.”
Instead of interpreting co-religionist commercial agreements
textually, courts can take a contextual approach and place a greater
primacy on divining parties’ intents. This would involve adopting
permissive rules on parol and extrinsic evidence, emphasizing course
of dealing and customary norms, and seeking subjective intents rather
than objective manifestations. Thus, instead of trying to determine—
as an objective matter—what the word “kosher” means in a consumer
contract or how to define “cause” in an employment agreement with
a house of worship, courts could interpret such terms by trying to
determine what the parties intended for the provisions to mean or
how those words are understood in a particular commercial industry.
Similarly, when faced with traditional religious agreements—such as
religious marriage contracts—in which religious doctrine prevents
parties from tinkering with the customary terms, courts could
interpret the agreement with reference to the subjective intent of the
parties and other contextual considerations. Doing so would align
contract enforcement with the intentions of the parties, thereby
fulfilling the overall purpose of the neutral-principles approach to coreligionist commerce, while still avoiding any need to delve into
62
ecclesiastical matters. Unfortunately, two doctrinal trends—one in
commercial law, the other in constitutional law—are making
contextual interpretation increasingly difficult. Developments in
commercial law encourage courts to limit the use of contextual and
parol evidence, thereby reducing parties’ ability to explain the intents
behind secular language. Yet developments in Establishment Clause
cases have expanded what courts consider to be ecclesiastical, and
thereby have reduced parties’ ability to codify their intentions in
writing. The combination limits ex ante what co-religionists can write
into an agreement, and ex post how co-religionists can actualize their
intentions.

60. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979).
61. Id.
62. See infra Part IV.
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II. NEW FORMALISM

One appropriate judicial response to the challenges of
interpreting co-religionist commercial instruments would be to focus
not on the content of religious doctrine, but on the intentions of the
63
parties. As long as courts avoid defining religious terms or
interpreting religious doctrine, they can circumvent Establishment
64
Clause prohibitions. In turn, by marshaling the variety of contract
doctrines that focus not on religious doctrine, but on the contracting
context, courts can leverage doctrinal tools that avoid the pitfalls of
the Establishment Clause while still interpreting and enforcing coreligionist commercial instruments that incorporate religious
65
terminology.
The growing influence of New Formalism—which now enjoys
66
strong scholarly and judicial support —has limited courts’ use of
these doctrines for permissive interpretation. New Formalism has
been described as “anti-antiformalism,” since it is a reaction to, and is
intended as a correction to, the realist jurisprudence that wrested
contract law from the formalism that defined it under Williston and
67
other early twentieth-century jurists. Realists, led by Karl Llewellyn,
deigned to shape contract law in the mid-to-late twentieth century to
incorporate the nascent rules embedded in the customs and practices
68
of commercial parties. The court’s job was to “look for the law in
life” and then incorporate an “immanent law” into contractual

63. Cf. Ellman, supra note 11, at 1416 (“What the courts needed to decide in the synagogue
cases was not the essence of Judaism, an unconstitutional if not impossible task, but rather the
essence of the grantor’s intent. The courts ought to have determined whether the language of
the trust instrument by which the grantor conditioned his gift should have been construed,
under normal rules of interpretation, to bar mixed seating.”).
64. For sources discussing these Establishment Clause prohibitions, see supra note 9.
65. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603–04.
66. For a theoretical defense and empirical support for the rise of New Formalism, see
generally Robert Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847
(2000).
67. See Charny, supra note 19, at 842–43; Mark L. Movsesian, Formalism in American
Contract Law: Classical and Contemporary, 12 IUS GENTIUM 115, 116 (2006); Robert E. Scott,
The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 379–80 (2004).
68. See, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 626 (1975); Scott, supra note 66, at 871–72; Charny, supra note 19,
at 842–43; see also Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s
Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141,
1151–60 (1985) (“The rules incorporate actual business practices, however, only to the extent
that such practice comported with Llewellyn’s view of sound and reasonable commercial
conduct.”).
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69

disputes. Adjudicating under Llewellyn’s realism—and the UCC
that Llewellyn crafted—therefore required the costly tasks of
understanding the contracting environment and discovering the
immanent norms surrounding each case, such as the subjective intent
of the parties, the parties’ course of dealing, and the given industry’s
70
standards.
New Formalism, primarily motivated by reducing the costs of
contracting, squarely aims at reintroducing formalism into contract
law. But unlike the formalism of the early twentieth century, in which
71
traditional legal definitions and logic dictated contract law, New
Formalism is motivated by a desire to convey predictable outcomes to
72
contracting parties should a dispute spill over into court. New

69. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 122
(1960); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999); Danzig, supra note 68, at 635.
70. See James W. Bowers, Incomplete Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 1229, 1273 (2002); Zipporah B.
Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465,
504–05 (1987).
71. See C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 4–5 (Little, Brown, &
Co. 1880); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon
Fuller’s “Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 106 (2000); Movsesian, supra note
67, at 121; see also Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605–10
(1908) (describing the early twentieth-century legal order as a “scientific legal system”
threatening to become “a mechanical jurisprudence” of logical deductions from traditional
rules).
Earlier classicists generally understood the legal order as a logical weaving of rules into
a harmonious, rational, gapless whole—emphasizing a conceptual and abstract essentialism. See
Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN ST.
L. REV. 397, 405 (2004) (citing CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS (Little, Brown, & Co. 1871)) (characterizing late nineteenth to early
twentieth-century formalism as trying to “systematiz[e] the great body of common law cases
along a modest number of general principles”).
72. See Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
473, 497–98 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 636, 644 (1999); see, e.g., Glenn S. Koppel, The Functional and Dysfunctional Role of
Formalism in Federalism: Shady Grove Versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 907
(2012) (“This Article’s thesis is that formalism can be justified . . . in functional terms such as
enhancing predictability.”); Posner, supra note 45, at 752–53 (noting that while literal contract
enforcement can produce error, “at least this error would be predictable”); Schwartz, supra note
20, at 618 (arguing that firms prefer the state “to enforce the contracts they write,” because they
prefer adjudicators to be more accurate on average rather than perfect in every instance); Scott,
supra note 66, at 859–60 (arguing that “[i]f correct interpretation is indeed an important value
and if this requires interpretation that is transparent and predictable,” then a formalist approach
is better); Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 823, 844–45 (2000) (observing the common suggestion that courts “should
engage in a literalistic interpretation of verifiable terms to preserve the value of predictable
interpretation and advance standardization”).
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Formalism therefore relies on bright-line rules over standards, textual
interpretation over either contextual approaches or permissive rules
on allowing extrinsic evidence to explain ambiguous language, and
penalty rules on the definiteness requirement over encouraging courts
73
to fill contractual gaps. The logic of New Formalism is that
predictable and inexpensive court interventions—even interventions
that are unlikely to accurately implement what the parties originally
intended—would be mutually preferred ex ante by contracting
parties, especially parties likely to engage in multiple contractual
74
relations. If outcomes are easily foreseen, then costly litigation can
be avoided. Meanwhile, drafting errors are simply corrected in
subsequent contracts, and social norms and extralegal enforcement
75
stabilize ongoing contracting relations without court intrusion.
On one level, New Formalism is well suited to cater to parties,
like co-religionists, who engage in repeat transactions, have shared
norms that are more familiar to the parties than to any adjudicating
factfinder, and frequently use nonlegal norms to supplement legal
76
penalties. However, at its core, the central doctrines in New
Formalism presume that parties can adapt their commercial
agreements to account for problematic legal doctrines—a
presumption that often does not hold true for co-religionist

73. See Charny, supra note 19, at 849 (noting that with gap-filling, “formalism has
particular appeal because there is a readily available device” to resolve them: to infer consent to
the gap “from the voluntary decision to enter into the transaction”); Schwartz, supra note 20, at
618–19 (arguing for the implementation of a New Formalist–type approach); cf. Lisa Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms,
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1735–44 (2001) (exploring the extent to which private
legal systems can supply New Formalist approaches over courts’ gap-filling procedures).
74. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect
World: What To Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 323, 326 (2004) (“[T]he new formalists[’] . . . approach suggests
that while ex ante there is uncertainty about the future state of the world, . . . courts should be
modest about intervening.”); Scott, supra note 66, at 851 (asserting that a formalist approach
“require[s] the parties expressly to signal ex ante their preference for more aggressive modes of
interpretation of the contract terms”).
75. See Bernstein, supra note 73, at 1741–42; Scott, supra note 66, at 848.
76. See Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism, 6
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2009) (“This model predicts that the less contextual rules endorsed
by the New Formalists are likely to be preferred where transactions are frequent and
certain . . . .”); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 375, 429 (1990) (asserting that for rational parties who prefer nonlegal resolutions,
formalism “would minimize drafting costs”); Helfand, Religious Arbitration, supra note 53, at
1243–51 (2011) (exploring the use of arbitration to resolve disputes within religious
communities); Speidel, supra note 72, at 844.
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commerce. Thus, because parties to co-religionist commercial
agreements often cannot avoid the consequences of the
Establishment Clause, a court’s failure to employ antiformalist
interpretive tactics—such as inquiring into the parties’ shared
subjective intent and relational history—withholds from the
factfinder information that is essential to understand the dispute.
These antiformalist interpretive methods are crucial to the viability of
co-religionist commerce precisely because of certain Establishment
Clause prohibitions against judicial resolution of religious questions.
Thus, the Establishment Clause prohibits courts from using objective
methods to interpret co-religionist commercial agreements, whereas
New Formalism forecloses using subjective and contextual methods
of interpretation as an alternative.
Below we consider two types of problems posed by New
Formalism to co-religionist commerce: First, formalism can prevent
courts from interpreting and enforcing contracts for religious goods
and services. Second, courts sometimes misapprehend the contractual
intent of the parties to traditional religious contracts. In both
instances, parties to co-religionist commerce cannot translate their
agreements into secular terminology. And New Formalism—in its
refusal to use contextual evidence to surmise the parties’ intents—
distorts co-religionist commerce in deeply troublesome ways,
preventing parties from crafting financial instruments that achieve
both commercial and religious objectives.
A. Religious Goods and Services
The sale of religious goods and services stands as one of the
77
paradigmatic forms of co-religionist commerce. Producers of
religious goods and services advertise, market, and sell to clientele
specifically interested in the religious nature of these goods and
78
services. In so doing, these producers often employ religious
77. Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Practice and
Its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFFALO L. REV. 127, 180–83 (2003); see generally R. LAURENCE
MOORE, SELLING GOD: AMERICAN RELIGION IN THE MARKETPLACE OF CULTURE (1994)
(recounting the commercialization of religious goods and services since the beginning of the
nineteenth century).
78. See, e.g., Mayo, supra note 3, at 620–22 (describing the market for “quasi-religious
products and services” and noting the $4.6 billion Christian-products industry). For some
examples of companies marketing Christian goods and services, see Christian Retailing,
CHRISTIAN RETAILING, http://www.christianretailing.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2015), and Faith
Centered Resources, FAITH CENTERED RESOURCES, http://www.faithcenteredresources.com
(last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
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terminology to describe their goods and services to attract the interest
and earn the trust of prospective purchasers. But the success of such
co-religionist markets is predicated on the ability of courts to
interpret, enforce, and otherwise hold participants accountable in
these co-religionist markets when they employ religious terminology
to market and sell religious goods and services. Because parties
cannot always adequately describe the religious goods and services in
secular terminology, courts often abstain from interpreting coreligionist agreements so as to avoid running afoul of the
Establishment Clause. And a purely formalist approach to
interpreting religious terminology prevents courts from using
contextual evidence to uncover the parties’ shared understandings.
For example, consider the recently dismissed class-action lawsuit
against ConAgra, the parent corporation of the Hebrew National
79
brand. According to a complaint filed in 2012, ConAgra advertises
and sells meat products under the Hebrew National label, describing
them as “100% kosher” “as defined by the most stringent Jews who
80
follow Orthodox Jewish law.” The plaintiffs contended, however,
that contrary to these representations, Hebrew National meat
81
products did not satisfy these kosher standards. As a result,
purchasers of Hebrew National meat products allegedly overpaid for
82
these products, mistakenly believing them to be “100% kosher.”
And having misrepresented the kosher quality of these meat
products, the plaintiffs claimed that ConAgra should be held liable

79. Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1000 (D. Minn. 2013), vacated
and remanded, 747 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2014). The dismissal by the District Court of Minnesota
was subsequently reversed on other grounds by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. Wallace, 747 F.3d at 1033. According to the Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs failed to
plead injury in an individualized or particular manner, thereby failing to demonstrate standing
to bring the suit. Id. at 1028. The Court of Appeals thereby avoided addressing the
Establishment Clause question at the heart of the case. Because the Court of Appeals
concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing, however, it remanded the case back to state court.
Id. at 1032. And on remand, the District Court of Minnesota dismissed the action on First
Amendment grounds, paralleling the same analysis employed by the federal district court. See
Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 19HA-CV-12-3237, at 10–17 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 3, 2014),
available at http://failedmessiah.typepad.com/files/suit-against-hebrew-national-dismissed-10-62014.pdf.
80. Class Action Complaint at 3, Wallace, 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. June 6, 2012) (No.
0:12-cv-1354).
81. Id. at 17–21.
82. Id. at 64.
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for damages for breach of contract, negligence, and violation of
83
various consumer-protection laws.
The Hebrew National litigation was far from the first time
questions over the meaning of “kosher” made their way into U.S.
84
courts. A number of states had attempted to incorporate definitions
of kosher into consumer protection legislation, only to have such
85
legislation struck down as violating the Establishment Clause. The
District Court of Minnesota similarly dismissed the Hebrew National
lawsuit, concluding—as prior courts had when scrutinizing consumerfraud legislation that regulated the labeling of kosher food—that
“[t]he definition of the word ‘kosher’ is intrinsically religious in
nature, and this Court may not entertain a lawsuit that will require it
to evaluate the veracity of Defendant’s representations that its
86
Hebrew National products meet any such religious standard.”
But, by conflating the Hebrew National lawsuit with litigation
over kosher legislation, the court missed the fundamental difference
between the two. Kosher legislation raised Establishment Clause
concerns because it entailed governmental endorsement of a
87
particular definition of the term “kosher.” By contrast, the Hebrew
National lawsuit avoided these Establishment Clause concerns
because it involved private plaintiffs who simply alleged that the
defendant had mislabeled its product.
This key difference presented the district court with an
opportunity to allow the suit to go forward. For, instead of delving
into the objective meaning of the word “kosher,” the court could have
used contextual evidence to evaluate whether the parties had a shared
understanding of what “kosher” meant. By shifting its focus from the
objective meaning of “kosher” to the subjective understanding of the
parties, the court therefore could have focused on the central and
meaningful question of whether Hebrew National’s labeling was

83. Id. at 1–6.
84. See cases cited supra note 50.
85. See Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.5 (4th
Cir. 1995) (listing twenty-one states that have adopted such laws). For a discussion of the
constitutionality of these laws, see Kent Greenawalt, Religious and Civil Law: Using Secular
Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 785–
810 (1998).
86. Wallace, 920 F. Supp. at 999.
87. The plaintiffs emphasized this point in their briefing. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 33–35, Wallace, 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D.
Minn. Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 0:12-cv-1354).
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misleading without running afoul of Establishment Clause
prohibitions.
Indeed, Hebrew National had provided some of that context in
its advertising by specifically referencing “Orthodox” standards of
88
kosher. Hebrew National’s advertising campaign may have intended
those terms to convey a particular representation to potential
consumers. Thus, interrogating the subjective intent of the parties
might have yielded a shared interpretation of the term that could
have been employed to evaluate whether or not the advertising
constituted either false advertising or a breach of contract.
Moreover, the court might have used contextual evidence to
evaluate Hebrew National’s “kosher” representations in light of
various aids of interpretation. It could have considered the
consistency of Hebrew National’s implementation of its kosher
standards under the course-of-dealing rubric for contract
89
interpretation —a point made by the plaintiffs in their brief on the
90
motion to dismiss. And, maybe most materially, the court might
have considered the commercial standards for kosher certification,
which had become relatively uniform as a result of various market
91
pressures.
The district court’s failure to approach the Hebrew National
lawsuit through a contextual lens highlights how the case is not simply
about judicial interpretation of the Establishment Clause, but is more
fundamentally about judicial refusal to consider context when
interpreting private agreements. Such an outcome is fairly typical of
how New Formalism constrains a court’s ability to parse private
agreements between parties. The court assumed that the only method
for adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims was to provide an objective
interpretation of “kosher” based solely on the formal text of its
commercial representations. But a contextual approach could have
provided methods for interpreting the term “kosher” that did not
88. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 80, at *3.
89. TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE OF INDUSTRIAL
FOOD 81–84 (2013) (describing why the kosher certification adopted by Hebrew National has
become an industry outsider).
90. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 16, Wallace, 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2012)
(No. 0:12-cv-1354).
91. For the commercial reasons for uniformity of standards in the kosher-certification
market, see LYTTON, supra note 89, at 132–34 (explaining how the interdependence of the
kosher-certification market has led to the creation of increasingly uniform certification
standards).
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require becoming enmeshed in religious doctrine. A contextual
approach could have provided an equally useful answer to a slightly
different question: Did the parties have a shared understanding of the
term kosher?
The Hebrew National lawsuit is essentially about the interpretive
constraints of New Formalism. When contextual interpretive tools are
taken off the table, however, courts face the false dilemma of
dismissing co-religionist commercial claims or delving into the
objective meaning of religious terminology. To be sure, the use of
contextual evidence—such as subjective intent, course of dealing,
course of performance, and trade usage—might have been
insufficient to determine whether Hebrew National could be held
liable for consumer-protection fraud or breach of contract. But a
categorical embrace of New Formalism prevents courts from even
exploring this opportunity.
The challenge posed by New Formalism to co-religionist
commerce also arises when parties seek to incorporate adherence to
religious rules or doctrine as part of their commercial exchange. In
92
Katz v. Singerman, for example, the court considered whether to
enjoin a synagogue from allowing mixed seating (that is, permitting
men and women to sit together) on the grounds that it would violate
93
conditions placed by the grantor who donated the building. The
grantor, Benjamin Rosenberg, had donated property to the Chevra
Thilim Congregation on the condition that, among other things, the
building would “only be used as a place of Jewish worship according
94
to the strict ancient and orthodox forms and ceremonies.” The
congregation’s board of directors accepted the donation from
Rosenberg on the specific condition that, among other things, the
building would be used “for the worship of God according to the
95
Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual.” When the congregation considered
passing a resolution to permit mixed seating, the plaintiffs sought an
injunction, arguing that such a practice would fail to qualify as
“worship according to the strict ancient and orthodox forms” and

92.
93.
94.
95.

Katz v. Singerman, 127 So. 2d 515 (La. 1961).
Id. at 515.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 518.
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“Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual,” and thus would violate the
96
conditions of the donation.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, refused to enjoin the
resolution, concluding that its conditions were insufficiently definite,
97
clear, or specific. In reaching this conclusion, the court’s focus was
first and foremost formalistic, focusing its inquiry on the objective
meaning and content of “Orthodox Judaism.” The court considered
conflicting expert testimony over whether Orthodox Judaism
98
permitted mixed seating at services, and on this record, it concluded
that the formal meaning of the conditions provided insufficient
99
guidance to permit judicial enforcement of the terms.
To be sure, the court in Katz did—at least for a moment—
consider mining antiformalist resources to interpret the term
“Orthodox Judaism” by considering what the grantor himself actually
100
meant when employing the phrase “Orthodox Judaism.” But instead
of engaging in a contextualist inquiry—and considering actual
evidence regarding the grantor’s intent—the court folded the inquiry
into its larger formalist picture, concluding that “[i]t is reasonable to
presume that when Benjamin Rosenberg made the donation in
question he was aware of the fact that the ancient Jewish religion had
in the past undergone certain changes, modifications or evolutions in
101
its ritual, forms, and ceremonies.” On this basis, the court inferred
“that he must have contemplated that such changes would inevitably
102
occur in the future” and opted against gathering more evidence to
103
interpret what was meant by “Orthodox Judaism.”

96. Id. at 525–26. Many congregations have found themselves in divisive debates over
seating arrangements, including several that resulted in litigation. See, e.g., Davis v. Scher, 97
N.W.2d 137 (Mich. 1959) (adjudicating a dispute over mixed-gender seating in a synagogue).
97. Katz, 127 So. 2d at 533.
98. Id. at 527–32.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 532–33. For a similar critique of Katz, focusing more directly on the
Establishment Clause concerns than on the larger issues of contract interpretation, see Ellman,
supra note 11, at 1416 (“What the courts needed to decide in the synagogue cases was not the
essence of Judaism, an unconstitutional if not impossible task, but rather the essence of the
grantor’s intent. The courts ought to have determined whether the language of the trust
instrument by which the grantor conditioned his gift should have been construed, under normal
rules of interpretation, to bar mixed seating.”).
101. Katz, 127 So. 2d at 532–33 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 533. It is worth emphasizing that a true antiformalist approach does not construct
subjective intent by simply relying on theological propositions. For example, in Wolf v. Rose
Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 832 P.2d 1007 (Colo. App. 1991), a Colorado appellate court reversed a
trial-court decision that had denied a woman’s petition to disinter her father’s and sister’s
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Cases like Wallace and Katz significantly endanger co-religionist
commerce because they so severely limit the flexibility of important
104
ecclesiastical terms. Because co-religionist transactions routinely
employ ecclesiastical references to specify their relations, the
translation problem already limits their ability to use alternative
terms. New Formalism further constrains parties’ ability to elaborate
or explain, ex post, through parol or contextual evidence, what they
mean when they use particular ecclesiastical terms. Unsurprisingly,
courts interpreting religious terminology (to the degree the
Establishment Clause permits) see far less nuance, depth, and
variation in those terms than do the parties who chose them. This is
particularly true for terms that apply to a variety of uncertain
105
circumstances over an extended period of time. Consequently, a
formalist approach that prohibits parties from explaining themselves
remains because the trial court had improperly concluded that doing so would contravene
Orthodox Jewish law. Id. at 1008. Although the trial court appears to have considered
interpretations of Jewish law as an indication of what the father “would have intended,” the
tenuous link between Jewish law and the actual intent of the father exposes the trial court’s
analysis as insufficiently attentive to contextualism, disguising a brand of formalism in
antiformalist terminology. See generally id. (noting that “[u]ncontroverted testimony indicated
that the father worked and drove a car on the Sabbath, dined at non-kosher restaurants, and
only went to synagogue on high holidays which would indicate that he was not an Orthodox
Jew”).
103. In critiquing Ellman, supra note 11, Professor Kent Greenawalt has argued that too
strong an emphasis on subjective intent might lead a court to improperly use theological
propositions as a proxy for parties’ intent. See Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1892. There are
good reasons to share Greenawalt’s concerns. Indeed, such concerns would seem to counsel
caution in using antiformalist techniques—such as trade usage or evidence of subjective intent—
when interpreting co-religionist commercial instruments. These concerns should not, however,
lead us to abandon antiformalism in the co-religionist context, especially given the significant
problems with pursuing a purely formalist approach.
104. Notably, these problems persist in currently active litigation. See, e.g., Plaintiff Shearith
Israel’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer at 4,
Congregation Shearith Isr. v. Congregation Jeshuat Isr., 983 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(No. 12-cv-8406) (arguing for ownership of religious property based on a proviso claiming that
religious services at the synagogue housing the property be conducted “according to the Ritual,
Rites and Customs of the ORTHODOX SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE JEWS, as at this
time practiced and observed in the Synagogue of the CONGREGATION SHEARITH
ISRAEL in the City of New York”).
105. Another prominent example of this dynamic—in which parties used religious choice-oflaw provisions—is Sieger v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102 (App. Div. 2002). In Sieger, the contract
between the parties provided that any disputes arising out of their agreement would be settled
“in accordance with the regulations of Speyer, Worms, and Mainz.” Id. at 104. But instead of
using contextual evidence to interpret the provisions, the court refused to enforce them,
concluding that doing so “would place [the court] in the inappropriate role of deciding whether
religious law has been violated.” Id. at 105 (quoting Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1033
(N.Y. 2001)).
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too often leads to a misunderstanding or undermining of the parties’
intents. In these instances, formalist legal reasoning not only impedes
co-religionists from seeking to engage in rudimentary and mutually
beneficial commercial exchange, but it even undermines the very
objectives of New Formalism. Rather than enabling parties to write
clear, readily enforceable contracts, New Formalism can invalidate
many effective, efficient contractual references that co-religionists are
likely to use. Courts’ commitment to formalism leaves the parties with
little leeway in enacting their contractual intents.
B. Traditional Religious Agreements
As noted above, New Formalism excludes considerations of
context and intent in deciding questions of contract formation and
106
interpretation and instead looks to outward manifestations of
107
contractual formation and meaning. One problem with applying this
approach to co-religionist relationships is that it sometimes presumes
contractual intent when no such intent exists. Indeed, co-religionists
often participate in ceremonial events highlighted by religious
documents that are intended to reflect religious symbolism rather
108
than contractual obligations. Such distinctions are typically obvious
to the participants who share religious affiliations—and who
therefore understand the shared customs of the given religious
community—but formalism’s discounting of context ignores such
shared understandings, leading courts to enforce ceremony as

106. See Bowers, supra note 70, at 1273; Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words:
Some Realism About the New Formalism (with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 15–16 (2001); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New
Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61,
101 (2009). But see Jonathan Yovel, Relational Formalism and the Construction of Financial
Instruments, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 371, 372 (2011).
107. See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 781, 789–92 (1999) (critiquing erosion doctrines that are vital to contextual
interpretation, such as waiver and course of performance); Charny, supra note 19, at 854–55
(lamenting antiformalists’ willingness to consider “general norms of fairness . . . ; bans on
certain types of intentional advantage-taking; or . . . considerations of need” when interpreting a
contract); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 20, at 618 (proposing an economic model that
discourages the use of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of contracts between firms);
William C. Whitford, Relational Contracts and the New Formalism, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 631, 643
(2004) (describing New Formalism as rekindling the neoclassical touchstones of “plain meaning,
. . . a strict parol evidence rule, and . . . the indefiniteness doctrine”).
108. Of course, the fact that such documents no longer reflect contractual intentions is not
to say that they cease to have importance within the given religious community. Indeed,
attempts to modify the form of such documents will likely be met with fierce resistance.
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contract. Moreover, the traditions surrounding the use of such
religious documents are often quite rigid, limiting the parties’ ability
to modify the substance of those documents or to tailor them to
capture the parties’ specific religious intent. As a result, a strict
application of contractual formalism is unlikely to lead to the
modification of the religious documents, and a textualist reading of
those documents will likely generate misinterpretations of intent.
One illustration of this challenge routinely surfaces in disputes
109
over Islamic mahr agreements, which are contracts executed as part
110
of the traditional Islamic marriage process. Such mahr agreements
are given by the groom to the bride in exchange for the bride entering
111
into the marriage contract, and generally require the husband to
109. See, e.g., Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 248–49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(enforcing a mahr agreement because it met the requirements of secular contract law);
Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://www.
volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/soleimani.pdf (discussing why Establishment Clause
principles precluded the interpretation of a mahr agreement); Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93,
96, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) (concluding that a mahr agreement was not invalid simply
because it was entered into at the marriage ceremony); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (enforcing
a mahr agreement because it met the requirements of secular contract law); Zawahiri v.
Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *5–6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (upholding the lower
court’s finding that a mahr provision of an Islamic marriage contract was void because the
parties did not discuss the provision until the day of marriage, and because of the hurried
negotiation conditions); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190, 195–96 (Tex. App. 2008) (using
parol evidence to supplement a mahr agreement, but remanding the case for reconsideration as
to whether the agreement complied with the statutory requirements for antenuptial agreements
because the agreement was signed after the parties were civilly married); In re Marriage of
Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787, 788, 791–92 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a mahr agreement was
unenforceable for a variety of reasons, including because the terms of the agreement failed to
sufficiently describe the husband’s financial obligation; the contract’s negotiation was conducted
in Farsi, which the husband did not speak; and the husband only learned that he would be
signing a mahr agreement, an agreement with which he was not familiar, at the marriage
ceremony); Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07 DR-02-756 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas Oct. 10, 2007)
(refusing to enforce a mahr agreement on Establishment Clause grounds).
110. Under Islamic law, a husband’s mahr obligations exist in the absence of a contractual
arrangement; they are a legal requirement of marriage itself. See Oman, Bargaining, supra note
56, at 590 (“Under the classical fiqh, a marriage contract is not valid without a mahr.”). Indeed,
the amount that the husband must pay under the mahr obligation would be determined by a
court in the absence of an agreement. See Chelsea A. Sizemore, Enforcing Islamic Mahr
Agreements: The American Judge’s Interpretational Dilemma, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1085,
1087 (2011) (“If the marriage contract does not contain a specified mahr, the husband still must
pay the wife a judicially determined sum, typically based on the mahr amount that women of
equivalent social status receive.”).
111. See Shiva Falsafi, Religion, Women, and the Holy Grail of Legal Pluralism, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 1881, 1914 (2014) (“The Qur’an defines the mahr as a gift to the bride for
entering into the marriage contract.”); see also QUR’AN 4:4 (“And give the women (on
marriage) their mahr as a (nikah) free gift”). It is worth noting that whereas the Qur’an
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make two financial payments to his wife. The first of these payments
is given to the wife immediately upon marriage; the second portion—
the deferred mahr—is held in trust for the wife to be distributed in
112
the event of divorce or the husband’s death. Courts have struggled
113
with, and scholars have debated, how to resolve disputes over mahr
agreements, in large part because they stand at the nexus of three
areas of law: statutory rules governing both pre- and postnuptial
agreements; common-law contract doctrines, such as mutual assent,
integration, and parol evidence; and constitutional law, most notably
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
On its face, the mahr agreement is a standard financial
agreement that obligates the husband, in the event of divorce, to
provide his wife a financial payment. However, because the mahr is a
staple of a traditional Muslim wedding ceremony, its presentation and
ceremonial signing reveal mixed motivations and multiple
114
objectives. To illustrate, in In re the Marriage of Obaidi the court
described the defense of one husband, Khalid Qayoum, in refusing to
pay his ex-wife the payment required by their mahr:
The Nikkah [wedding] ceremony was conducted in Farsi, except
when Mr. Aji-sab, who performed the ceremony, asked Mr.
Qayoum if he wanted to marry Ms. Obaidi. Mr. Qayoum does not
speak, read, or write Farsi. Mr. Qayoum has lived in the United
States for all but two or three years of his life. He considers himself
“American first.” He explained that he went through the Afghan
marriage process because his mother was concerned that he would
lose even the small amount of cultural knowledge he had about

describes the mahr as a “gift,” it is a “mandatory part of an Islamic marriage contract.” Falsafi,
supra, at 1917; see also sources cited supra note 110.
112. Oman, Bargaining, supra note 56, at 588–93. To be sure, Islamic law entitles the wife to
the mahr at the time of marriage, and the deferring of a portion of the mahr “is a matter of
contractual forbearance on her part.” Oman, How to Judge, supra note 56, at 302.
The purpose of the mahr is to ensure that upon the dissolution of marriage, the wife has
secured assets and is not left completely destitute in the event that the husband is no longer
providing financial support. See, e.g., Tracie Rogalin Siddiqui, Interpretation of Islamic Marriage
Contracts by American Courts, 41 FAM. L.Q. 639, 644 (2007).
113. See, e.g., Blenkhorn, supra note 56; Richard Freeland, The Islamic Institution of Mahr
and American Law, 4 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 2, 2–4 (2000); Oman, How to Judge, supra note 56;
Oman, Bargaining, supra note 56; Trumbull, supra note 56; Ghada G. Qaisi, Note, Religious
Marriage Contracts: Judicial Enforcement of Mahr Agreements in American Courts, 15 J.L. &
RELIGION 67, 71–72 (2000).
114. Cf. Estin, supra note 57, at 575 (2004) (“Contemporary Islamic marital agreements
often reflect new expectations and circumstances, and Muslim communities in the United States
actively debate how to adapt [the mahr’s] traditions to the American legal environment.”).
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Afghanistan. Mr. Qayoum testified that he had never heard the
115
word “mahr” before the day of the Nikkah ceremony.

Although the court in Obaidi allowed the contracting context to
support a defense to the mahr’s enforcement, not all courts are willing
to resist the general trend of New Formalism when enforcing mahr
116
agreements. For example, in Akileh v. Elchalal, a Florida court
enforced a mahr contract on formalist grounds, concluding that for
the purposes of interpretation the “husband’s subjective intent at the
time he entered into the agreement is not material in construing the
117
118
contract.” And in Aziz v. Aziz, a New York court enforced a
mahr agreement, emphasizing the agreement’s formal conformity
with the relevant contract doctrines over the husband’s contention
that the “mahr is a religious document and not enforceable as a
119
contract.”
To be sure, choosing to enforce such agreements might reflect
the correct outcome because the parties may, in fact, have intended
the mahr agreements to reflect actual contractual obligations. But
courts will not know whether the contractual obligations they choose
to enforce accurately reflect the parties’ intentions until they
recognize the limitations of formalism as applied to traditional coreligionist agreements.
A similar issue often arises in the context of the ketubah, the
120
written document featured in Jewish weddings. On the one hand,
the ketubah literally details a transaction, and marrying couples often
treat it as a contractual instrument by adding language that accurately

115. In re Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787, 789 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
116. Akileh v. Elchalal, 666 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
117. Id. at 249.
118. Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
119. Id. at 124. Other judicial decisions have been more ambiguous as to the relative balance
they hope to strike between formalist and antiformalist approaches. In Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810
A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002), for example, a New Jersey court enforced a mahr
contract, outlining a purely formalistic standard against which such agreements should be
judged. Id. at 98 (“[T]he Mahr Agreement in the case at bar is nothing more and nothing less
than a simple contract between two consenting adults.”). The court reviewed the context of the
agreement, detailing video evidence of the negotiation and the signing of the contract, but it
provided limited justification for inferring contractual—as opposed to ceremonial—intent from
the husband’s signing the agreement. Id. at 97.
120. See generally J. David Bleich, Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature: The
Ketubah, 31:2 TRADITION 50, 53–55 (1997) (discussing the role of the ketubah in Jewish
marriage ceremonies).
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reflects an intent to be bound by a promise. Yet on the other hand,
the ketubah’s language is rarely read and understood by the marrying
couple, and it is often brought into the modern wedding ceremony to
pay homage to old traditions and imbue the wedding with religious
symbolism, rather than to memorialize a specific, negotiated
122
agreement. Relying on formalist logic, courts have interpreted the
ketubah to subject the parties to a variety of contractual obligations—
obligations neither party may ever have intended—including an
obligation to submit to the authority of a rabbinical tribunal in order
123
to execute a religious divorce. Rarely have courts inquired whether
the agreements manifest contractual intent or simply manifest
customary symbolism.
The problems associated with confusing ceremony for contract
are not limited to the marriage context; they can just as easily
undermine arm’s-length commercial arrangements. In Colby v.
124
Newman, for example, the court scrutinized the enforceability of a
125
The original
so-called “Sabbath Partnership Agreement.”
transaction between the parties included a purchase of assets and an
employment agreement, whereby the defendants hired the individual
126
plaintiffs. However, the defendants also proposed to execute an
agreement that would transfer ownership of the business to plaintiffs
127
on the Jewish Sabbath and “Jewish Holidays.” The purpose of this
agreement was to allow the defendants to keep their businesses open

121. See Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract and the
First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 346–48 (1992) (describing the contractual provisions of
the ketubah); Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial
Agreements, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 375–76 (1999) (describing the trend within
Conservative Judaism to insert the “Lieberman Clause” into the ketubah).
122. See, e.g., Breitowitz, supra note 121, at 347; Linda S. Kahan, Note, Jewish Divorce and
Secular Courts: The Promise of Avitzur, 73 GEO. L.J. 193, 216–17 (1984).
123. See, e.g., Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1992); Minkin v. Minkin, 434
A.2d 665, 665–66 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981); Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y.
1983).
It is also worth noting that some courts have refused to enforce these provisions of the
ketubah on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 528–29 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996). Such cases may represent a significant irony; to avoid the
consequences of potentially exaggerating the degree of contractual intent manifested by the
ketubah, courts may have to exaggerate the scope of the Establishment Clause.
124. Colby v. Newman, 2:11-cv-7413 (C.D. Cal. filed June 11, 2013).
125. Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment; to Dismiss; and for Sanctions, Colby v.
Newman, (C.D. Cal. filed June 11, 2013) (No. 2:11-cv-7413).
126. Id. at *2.
127. Id.
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while avoiding Jewish law’s prohibition against engaging in “work”
128
on the Jewish Sabbath and Jewish holidays. Under the Sabbath
Partnership Agreement, the business would technically be owned by
129
the defendants, whom the plaintiffs assumed were not Jewish.
Indeed, the parties alluded to the agreement’s underlying purpose in
the text of the document itself, which stated: “This deed fulfills all the
130
requirements of Jewish Law set forth by the Jewish sages.”
According to the terms of the Sabbath Partnership Agreement, the
plaintiffs were entitled to one-seventh of the profits from the
131
business —profits that the plaintiffs pursued as part of their
132
complaint against the defendants.
Sabbath Partnership Agreements are common in certain
religious communities, and they are intended as a religiously
sanctioned loophole that technically shifts ownership to non-Jews on
133
the Jewish Sabbath and holidays.
Parties enter into these
agreements to comply with the legal strictures of religious law and
rarely intend to convey an economic interest via an enforceable
commercial agreement. In Colby, for example, the plaintiffs, in the
four years between the execution of the agreement and the filing of
the lawsuit, never once sought to collect the profits provided for by
134
the Sabbath Partnership Agreement. Indeed, it was not clear
whether, before the onset of litigation, the plaintiffs had engaged in
any conduct typical of business partners, such as attending
partnership meetings or making the type of business decisions typical
135
of partners.

128. See Colby v. Newman, 2:11-cv-7413, Document 204, at *7 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 4, 2013).
129. As it turned out, the defendants were mistaken in this assumption: the plaintiffs were in
fact Jewish—an error that led the plaintiffs to claim, albeit unsuccessfully, that the contract
should be rescinded on the ground of mistake. See id. at *8.
130. Colby v. Newman, 2:11-cv-7413, Document 207-9, at *3 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 12, 2013)
(Exhibit 7).
131. Id.
132. Second Amended Complaint, Colby v. Newman, (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 29, 2011) (No.
2:11-cv-7413).
133. Cf. Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business
Structures: The Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1740 (1997) (noting that if Jewish
law were to conceptualize shareholders as partners in a business, then the “partners” would be
liable if the business were to operate on the Sabbath).
134. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Colby v. Newman, 2:11-cv-7413,
(filed Jan. 4, 2013). The defendants framed this argument in terms of laches as opposed to the
failure of mutual assent.
135. Id.
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The court, however, took a purely formal approach to the
agreement and opted against considering any contextual evidence
that could have elucidated the parties’ shared understandings. The
court explained that it would admit “evidence concerning the parties’
intentions” only where there was an ambiguity in the text of the
136
contract. As a result, it refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim to
profits pursuant to the Sabbath Partnership Agreement, leaving open
the possibility of transferring millions of dollars to the plaintiffs.
Conflating ceremony and contract, the court enforced a document
that neither party had believed to be an enforceable agreement.
These unanticipated legal outcomes are more than just
uncomfortable inconveniences. They reflect and contribute to deep
confusion over both documents designed to codify co-religionist
commercial dealings and documents that are expressly not intended
137
to be anything more than ceremonial. Moreover, the typical
formalist responses to judicial errors—“leave the losses where they
fall” and correct the judicial error either extralegally or by drafting
138
contracts differently —are, to say the least, inappropriate. For the
mahr or ketubah, expecting parties to adjust to formalist rules would
force marrying couples to revise ancient traditions and transform a
timeless ceremony to unnecessarily avoid judicially superimposed
commercial consequences. And for some religious players in the
commercial markets, adjusting to formalism would foreclose
religiously sanctioned loopholes that have been developed carefully
over generations to reconcile religious convictions with financial
needs. However groundbreaking New Formalism has become in
transforming our understanding and implementation of contract law,
and in unleashing important transactional efficiencies, these cases
reveal meaningful limits to the effectiveness of formalism. Surely the
law can do better than persisting with formalist logic when
rudimentary circumspection would produce better outcomes.
136. Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment; to Dismiss; and for Sanctions at *31, Colby
v. Newman, 2:11-cv-7413 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
137. As we note below, there are some instances in which courts have done a far better job
discerning the shared understanding of parties, thereby distinguishing true co-religionist
commerce from mere religious ceremony. See infra Part III.B.
138. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 346 (3d ed.
2002); see also Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of
Opportunism Defeats A Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 69–70 (2008) (“If
one applies a textualist approach that does not allow for implied terms or a broad approach to
judicial interpretation, then courts will be unable to solve some critical problems for the parties,
which failure will engender deadweight losses.”).
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III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CREEP
Formalist approaches to co-religionist commerce have led courts
to myopic and misleading understandings of ecclesiastical terms and
co-religionist instruments. The opposite has been true in
constitutional law, where courts have suffered not from myopia, but
from operating at too high a level of abstraction.
In advancing the neutral-principles framework, the Supreme
Court enabled courts to resolve co-religionist commercial disputes
while avoiding the religious question doctrine—that is, the
constitutional prohibition against interpreting religious doctrine or
139
practice.
This framework encourages co-religionist parties to
remove religious references from instruments they intend to be
legally enforceable and thus separate ecclesiastical from secular
140
matters. Following a trend we have termed Establishment Clause
Creep, however, judicial decisions have slowly moved in the opposite
direction. Instead of carefully distinguishing secular from
ecclesiastical issues, courts often conflate the two. And instead of
using the neutral-principles approach to avoid religious questions,
courts view religious questions so broadly as to leave little room for
141
applying the neutral-principles approach. Consequently, courts have
refused to adjudicate a wider range of disputes than is constitutionally

139. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 134–37 (arguing that Jones v. Wolf reaffirmed
courts’ prohibition on resolving religious questions).
140. See id.
141. Others have worried about excessive judicial expansion of the Establishment Clause to
cases in which disputes do not implicate religious questions or religious doctrine. See, e.g.,
Muhammad Elsayed, Note & Comment, Contracting Into Religious Law: Anti-Sharia
Enactments and the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 937, 969
(2013) (collecting cases and concluding that “[i]n applying the neutral principles of law doctrine,
some courts have mechanically refused to adjudicate disputes involving religious agreements for
fear of violating the Establishment Clause. This refusal to sift through complex cases to
determine where secular matters end and religious doctrine begins can exact a heavy cost on
religious individuals who may be left without legal recourse as a result of this hypersensitivity in
dealing with religious disputes” (footnote omitted)); Kevin J. Murphy, Note, Administering the
Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor: Why Contract Claims Should Not Be Barred, 28
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 395 (2014) (collecting cases and concluding that
“most [courts] read Hosanna-Tabor to bar all wrongful termination claims by ministers
regardless of the substance of the employment contract”); see also Falsafi, supra note 111, at
1900–27 (collecting religious-divorce cases and highlighting the problematic application of the
neutral-principles framework, including repeated overexpansion of the Establishment Clause to
preclude adjudication of such cases); cf. Ashley Alderman, Where’s the Wall?: Church Property
Disputes Within the Civil Courts and the Need for Consistent Application of the Law, 39 GA. L.
REV. 1027, 1042–51 (2005) (collecting cases and highlighting systemic uncertainty and
inconsistency in the judicial application of the neutral-principles framework).
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necessary, even those in which rulings could easily avoid deciding
questions of religious law and doctrine. When courts interpret these
Establishment Clause prohibitions so broadly, they thwart the shared
intent of the parties and undermine co-religionist commercial
markets.
A. Contract and Context: Narrowing the Space for Neutral Principles
As noted above, courts have struggled to address the recent
142
influx of cases contesting the enforceability of mahr contracts. For
143
example, in Soleimani v. Soleimani, a Kansas state court refused to
144
enforce a mahr agreement. After concluding that the document,
145
which was written in Farsi, had no agreed-upon translation, the
court then determined that the document presented such unfamiliar
146
questions that parol evidence would not “aid the court.” The court
147
thus deemed the mahr unenforceable.
But the Kansas court’s reluctance to enforce the agreement went
far beyond any concern over enforcing an irreparably vague
document. To the contrary, the court concluded that mahr
agreements are inherently suspect because “they stem from
jurisdictions that do not separate church and state, and may, in fact,
148
embed discrimination through religious doctrine.” The court thus
worried that enforcing such agreements threatened equal-protection
requirements because the process of divorce in Islamic law entails the
“basic denial of due process” by granting the husband the power to
149
unilaterally effectuate the divorce. To enforce mahr agreements
would “[p]erpetuat[e] such discrimination under the guise of judicial
142. See supra notes 109–19 and accompanying text.
143. Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/soleimani.pdf.
144. Id. at 33–34.
145. Id. at 12–13. The court also emphasized that the amount of the deferred mahr—
$677,000—was so large that it functioned as a penalty for divorce. Id. at 26. Therefore, enforcing
the mahr would have violated public policy. Id. at 26–29.
146. Id. at 26.
147. This conclusion was itself somewhat surprising under standard common-law contract
grounds. The court did note that the parties had agreed upon the existence of a contract and to
the contract’s “critical terms.” Id. at 14. Thus, it is unclear why the court could not use parol
evidence to supplement the agreement and fill in the necessary gaps created by the lack of an
authenticated translation. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216(1)
(“Evidence of a consistent additional term is admissible to supplement an integrated agreement
unless the court finds that the agreement was completely integrated.”).
148. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 at 29.
149. Id. at 30.
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sensitivity to Establishment Clause prohibitions,” and thereby
“abdicate the judiciary’s overall constitutional role to protect such
150
fundamental rights.” The court also invoked Kansas’s recently
151
enacted “anti-Sharia law”; like many of its counterparts in other
152
jurisdictions, the anti-Sharia law renders contracts unenforceable
when they incorporate rules from foreign or religious legal systems
“that would not grant the parties the same fundamental liberties,
rights and privileges granted under the United States and Kansas
153
constitutions.”
The mahr, however, need not be viewed as an inherently
religious or foreign instrument. The wife, in asking the court to
enforce the agreement, described the mahr merely as a severable and
independent financial agreement that should be interpreted and
154
enforced using “neutral principles of law.” The court, however,
refused, ruling:
Even assuming this Court could interpret the contract, it would then
be put in the dilemma of fashioning a remedy under a contract that
clearly emanates from a legal code that may be antithetical to

150. Id. The court never quite explained how enforcing the mahr agreement in question
would perpetuate the alleged discrimination. It is far from clear how preventing a wife from
enforcing an agreement requiring her husband to pay a debt to her—in this case, a substantial
debt of $677,000—would further perpetuate an allegedly discriminatory system whereby the
husband exercised too much authority.
151. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PRESS, Anti-Shariah Bill Advances in Kansas, BOS. GLOBE, May
12, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/05/11/anti-shariah-bill-advances-kansas/
UXdUEob8p17YmgHKZabRCJ/story.html.
152. See Omar Sacirbey, Anti-Sharia Movement Gains Success, HUFFINGTON POST (May 17,
2013, 12:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/17/anti-shariah-movement-gainssuccess_n_3290110.html (noting that six states have enacted various forms of the so-called antiSharia laws); see also Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: OK Approves New Ban;
WA Approves Modified Version; AL Approves Sweeping Constitutional Amendment; MO
Governor May Sign or Veto, GAVEL TO GAVEL (May 23, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/
site/2013/05/23/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-ok-approves-new-ban-wa-approves
-modified-version-al-approves-sweeping-constitutional-amendment-mo-governor-may-sign-orveto (providing an overview of recent legislation regarding use of religious law).
153. House Substitute for Senate Bill No. 79, 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws, 1089, § 4. It is worth
noting that the law requires that the contractual provision in question incorporate law that
undermines fundamental liberties “as applied to the dispute at issue,” a qualification that was not
only unaddressed by the court, but that would appear to undermine the court’s decision. Id.
(emphasis added). Indeed, by the terms of the statute, in Soleimani, it should not have been
enough to simply state that the mahr’s contractual provision connected to the same general legal
system or religious community that elsewhere employed a process deemed “discriminatory,”
just because the process of divorce was not “at issue.”
154. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 at 34.
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Kansas law. To suggest the mahr obligation is neutrally severable
155
from its religious context is not apparent.

Leaving aside the extraordinary implications of the word
“antithetical,” the court’s contention that commercial instruments are
inseparable from their “religious context” crisply reflects how
Establishment Clause Creep has expanded Establishment Clause
jurisprudence to threaten the integrity and reliability of co-religionist
156
commercial arrangements. Moreover, in refusing to apply the
Supreme Court’s neutral-principles doctrine—and actually aiming to
discard the doctrine altogether, calling it “more hopeful than
157
realistic” —the court suggested that recent interpretations of the
Religion Clauses might remove any remaining legal protection upon
158
which co-religionist commerce relies. Although the court’s language
is especially stark and uncompromising, it reveals the potential for a
court to use the Establishment Clause to invalidate the most intimate
arrangements, including one that intersects with family law and takes
place within a distinct ethnically homogeneous context.
155. Id. at 31. Indeed, in the event there was any question as to the court’s view of mahr
agreements, the court’s concluding discussion of the mahr answered with the following
proclamation:
[T]he protection of Kansas law, applicable to the parties here, requires an equitable
division of property in a secular system that is not controlled by the dictates of
religious authorities or even a society dominated by men who place values on women
in medieval terms.
Id. at 36. Of course, by refusing to enforce the mahr, the court prevented the wife from
collecting $677,000. Instead, the court allowed the husband to retain his premarital property
because he had given his wife $116,000 before their marriage. Id. The court also refused to
require the husband to provide continuing spousal support. Id. at 39.
156. At one point in the decision, the court states that its primary worry is the way in which
the mahr agreement degrades women by conceptualizing them as “chattel.” Id. at 33. It does so,
explained the court, because the mahr is “almost always . . . ill-defined, leaving some Islamic
courts to infer a mahr amount.” Id. And this valuation process, which uses criteria such as
family, beauty and virginity, “suggests [that] women are, comparatively-speaking, chattel, not
human beings. This entire valuation process is contrary to American jurisprudence . . . .” Id. Of
course, none of these worries were implicated in the case before the court because the mahr
agreement specified the amount of the mahr, therefore obviating the need for a valuation
process.
157. Id. at 34–35.
158. At one point, the court cites Nathan Oman’s article How to Judge Shari’a Contracts: A
Guide to Islamic Marriage Agreements in American Courts, supra note 56, at 314, as support for
its claim that a mahr agreement could not be severed from its religious context, Soleimani, No.
11CV4668 at 31. Oman argues, however, that the relationship between the mahr and its context
should lead to enforcing the mahr, but not as a premarital agreement. Oman, How to Judge,
supra note 56, at 323–24. This ensures that the wife can collect the secured debt of the mahr
from her husband without forgoing any other claims in the distribution of the marital property.
Id.
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This resistance to enforcing co-religionist commercial
instruments—and its application in the context of Islamic contracts—
is being noticed by more than soon-to-be-married couples. The
financial press has reported that, in large part because of rulings on
mahr agreements like Soleimani, the United States is not perceived to
159
be hospitable to the growing market for Islamic finance. In fact,
Fitch Ratings recently observed that U.S. legal precedents serve as
“[o]ne of the main limitations [preventing] effective enforcement” of
Islamic bonds. Although the Islamic bond market is growing
worldwide, Fitch Ratings warned that “[i]t remains uncertain whether
certificate holders will be able to enforce their contractual rights in
160
[U.S.] courts.” These uncertainties are only exacerbated by the
continued barrage of legislative initiatives in several states to pass
161
anti-Sharia laws.
These concerns are a material indicator of the economic harm—
to say nothing of limitations on religious commitments—imposed by
Establishment Clause Creep. Although there has been little litigation
162
over Islamic bond instruments, the growing case law over mahr
159. Mushfique Shams Billah, Arab Money: Why Isn’t the United States Getting Any?, 32 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 1055, 1092–93 (2011) (identifying First Amendment doctrine as a perceived
“barrier to Islamic finance in the United States”). In contrast, British regulators have taken
steps to facilitate the growth of Islamic finance in the United Kingdom, exempting various
Islamic financial instruments (sukuk) and similar bonds from certain domestic regulations. See
Ben Meggeson, Time for Britain to Sukuk and See, SNL FINANCIAL (Feb. 1, 2013).
Islamic finance or Sharia-compliant finance generally refers to banking and investment
activity that conforms with the requirements of Islamic law. Thus, for a fund to be Shariacompliant, it
may not invest in assets that violate the basic tenets of Islamic finance, which
proscribe: (1) riba (literally defined as “an increase” but commonly translated as
“interest”); (2) transactions that are gharar (an excessive uncertainty or speculation);
and (3) certain morally reprehensible industries according to Islam (such as those
engaging in gambling or pork products).
Russell Powell & Arthur DeLong, The Possible Advantages of Islamic Financial Jurisprudence:
An Empirical Study of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
393, 397 (2014).
160. Fitch: Sukuk 2013 Issuance Outlook Positive Following Solid 2012, REUTERS, Jan. 14,
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/14/idUSWLA005W820130114.
161. For examples of other anti-Sharia laws, see supra note 152. To be sure, some have
argued that Establishment Clause questions are more of a “sideshow” and that the primary
obstacles to Sharia-compliant finance in the United States stem from tax and regulatory rules.
E.g., Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Impossible, Highly Desired Islamic Bank, 5 WM. & MARY BUS.
L. REV. 105, 147 (2014).
162. There has, however, been some litigation related to the constitutionality of
governmental entanglement with Sharia-compliant financial instruments. See Murray v. U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, 681 F.3d 744, 745 (6th Cir. 2012) (alleging that the Department of Treasury
violated the Establishment Clause by committing federal dollars to American International
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agreements and other co-religionist commercial documents has been
noticed by sophisticated commercial parties, further undermining the
credibility of many co-religionist commercial instruments.
B. Confusing Religious Doctrine with Sociological Patterns: Avoiding
Neutral Principles of Law
Worries of Establishment Clause Creep do not simply inhabit
contract cases. Not surprisingly, as co-religionist commerce has
continued to expand, similar issues have arisen in tort actions, in
which courts make insufficient use of the neutral-principles approach.
In these cases too, courts use an overbroad reading of Establishment
Clause prohibitions to avoid adjudicating tort disputes between co163
religionists.
One notable area in which common-law torts and the religious
question doctrine have tussled is in claims of religious defamation.
For example, plaintiffs frequently file defamation suits against
religious leaders or co-religionists who have declared the plaintiffs as
sinners or as violators of shared religious communal standards of
164
behavior. When the plaintiff files a claim of defamation, the
defendant will typically assert the defense of truth, thereby drawing
the court into a dispute over the truth or falsity of the religious
165
claims.
In turn, courts generally dismiss claims for religious
166
defamation on such grounds.

Group, Inc. via the Troubled Asset Relief Program). For further discussion of Murray, see
Hamoudi, supra note 161, at 146–50.
163. For discussion of judicial treatment of religious tort claims, see Goldstein, supra note 9,
at 522–23; Idleman, supra note 9, at 219.
164. See, e.g., Farley v. Wis. Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (D. Minn.
1993) (hearing a pastor’s defamation suit against his former church organization after the
organization denied his church’s application to be a mission); Goodman v. Temple Shir Ami,
Inc., 712 So. 2d 775, 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (detailing a rabbi’s suit against his former
temple for defamation and breach of employment contract); Downs v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 683 A.2d 808, 810 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (hearing a former priesthood
candidate’s defamation suit after he was released from the archdiocese on disciplinary grounds);
Schoenhals v. Mains, 504 N.W.2d 233, 234 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (detailing church members’
fraud, defamation, and breach-of-contract suit against their former minister and church over the
termination of their membership).
165. See, e.g., Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 219 (D. Conn. 2000)
(dismissing the plaintiff’s defamation claim because addressing the defense of truth would
require impermissible entanglement with Canon law); Klagsbrun v. Va’ad Harabonim, 53 F.
Supp. 2d 732, 742 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing the plaintiff’s defamation claim because addressing
the defense of truth would require impermissible entanglement with Jewish law).
166. See cases cited supra note 165.
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However, not all claims of religious defamation follow this script.
167
In Abdelhak v. Jewish Press, for example, the plaintiff was an
Orthodox Jewish doctor, specializing in high-risk obstetrics, who sued
a Jewish newspaper for defamation because his name was published
on a list of individuals against whom a rabbinical court had issued a
168
seruv—an order of contempt. The list included the plaintiff’s name,
ostensibly because he had failed to grant his wife a divorce in
169
accordance with Jewish law. But both parties agreed that the
plaintiff’s name was included on the list due to misinformation
170
provided to the newspaper by the rabbinical court. This error was
particularly damaging to the plaintiff because his patients were
171
“almost without exception, women of the Orthodox Jewish faith,”
and the plaintiff consequently alleged that his reputation within the
religious community—and, in turn, his medical practice—was
172
severely damaged by the newspaper’s erroneous report.
Because both parties agreed that listing the plaintiff’s name was
an error, the court was able to avoid the standard constitutional
obstacle to adjudicating a claim of religious defamation. The
newspaper conceded its error and the court thus did not need to
173
determine the truth or falsity of a religious claim. The court
nonetheless dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff’s claim
174
required excessive entanglement with religious doctrine. Much of
the court’s reasoning focused on the manner in which the jury would
be asked to assess damages:
[N]o jury could determine how much of the decline in plaintiff’s
income resulted from the defamatory Seruv Listing, and how much
of the decline resulted from other factors, unless the jury immersed
itself in Orthodox Jewish beliefs. . . . Such conclusions could not be
drawn unless, again, the jury were to develop a keen understanding
of how an Orthodox Jew would view each such event. Such an
undertaking exemplifies the excessive involvement in matters of

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Abdelhak v. Jewish Press Inc., 985 A.2d 197 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
Id. at 200–02.
Id. at 201–02.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 202. In fact, the newspaper issued a retraction noting its error. Id.
Id. at 211.
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“faith . . . or ecclesiastical . . . custom” that the [New Jersey
175
Supreme] Court prohibited in McKelvey [v. Pierce].

One understands the court’s reticence to permit a jury of
laypeople to speculate into the behavior of a particular ethnic
community—the circumstances might be unlikely to produce an
accurate assessment. But although a damages calculation would
require an inquiry into the social consequences of a seruv, it would
not require rendering a determination regarding religious doctrine.
To the contrary, it is an empirical inquiry into social perceptions of
particular conduct within a given community—in the court’s words,
176
“how an Orthodox Jew would view such an event.” This sort of
damages assessment is a standard fact-finding inquiry that juries
routinely are asked to make in predicting the market consequences of
177
certain events, based on expert testimony and submitted evidence.
In this way, the court’s holding unnecessarily shrouded much of coreligionist commerce in deep mystery beyond the purview of judicial
assessment. Conflating religious doctrine with sociological
preferences not only offers another example of recent Establishment
Clause Creep, but it also immunizes tortfeasors against claims from
their co-religionists. Like contracts that are not enforced, torts
without redress are another consequence of Establishment Clause
Creep that exposes religious merchants to risks from which their
secular counterparts are protected.
IV. TOWARD A BETTER CONTEXTUALISM
Co-religionist commerce stands at the nexus of both public and
private law precisely because it involves transactions that pursue both
commercial and religious objectives. It therefore is vulnerable to
trends in constitutional law and commercial law that have unwittingly
combined to undermine the ability of co-religionists to secure
commercial relations.
175. Id. at 208 (quoting McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 851 (N.J. 2002)).
176. Id.
177. By way of an example, juries are expected to play this type of fact-finding role in
obscenity cases, in which they must determine communal standards of decency. See, e.g., Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973) (concluding that courts could continue to rely on juries in
obscenity cases, which require ascertaining “community standards of decency”); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 164–65 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (endorsing the use of
experts for determining community standards in obscenity cases).
For more critical analysis of Abdelhak, see Helfand, supra note 22, at 193–95; Helfand,
supra note 9, at 517–18.
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As Part II shows, New Formalism has prevented courts from
inquiring into the contracting context to determine the parties’
subjective contractual intent, even when commercial instruments are
written creatively to incorporate religious objectives while avoiding
178
Establishment Clause hurdles. And Establishment Clause Creep
has expanded the scope of cases in which courts refuse to enforce co179
religionist dealings on First Amendment grounds. Together, these
two trends have distorted the relationship between co-religionist
commerce and its particular commercial context, preventing courts
from providing the legal infrastructure necessary to ensure the
enforceability and predictability of co-religionist commerce.
But we need not—and ought not—close the courthouse doors to
co-religionist commerce. At its core, New Formalism instructs courts
to avoid identifying and effectuating customary norms and subjective
expectations because the costs of doing so are sufficiently high that
parties ex ante would prefer formalist over contextualist
180
adjudication. New Formalism thus is motivated purely by achieving
parties’ intents while minimizing transaction and error costs.
Moreover, it encourages courts to focus on the formal text of
commercial agreements only because it assumes that parties can react
to judicial decisions and adapt the terms of their agreements to track
181
clear legal rules.
However, parties to co-religionist commercial dealings cannot
similarly capture the advantages of formalism. Co-religionist
commercial parties have limited leeway to find contractual
terminology that both accurately reflects the religious objectives of
the parties and remains sufficiently secular to avoid nonenforcement
on Establishment Clause grounds; they cannot adapt their
agreements to the demands of the relevant legal doctrine by using
formal terms. And these Establishment Clause obstacles have
become increasingly formidable as courts have expanded the range of
disputes they refuse to adjudicate on account of Religion Clause
182
prohibitions.
As a result, parties cannot simply avoid costly
178. See supra Part II.B.
179. See supra Part II.A.
180. See, e.g., Badawi, supra note 76, at 22–23; Omri Ben-Shahar, The Erosion of Rights by
Past Breach, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 190, 216 (1999); Scott, supra note 66, at 376.
181. See Bernstein, supra note 20, at 1810; Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 138, at 46–47;
Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL LAW 152 (Kraus & Walt eds., 2000).
182. See supra Part II.A.
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litigation by circumventing the demands of the Establishment Clause.
To the contrary, the Establishment Clause often prevents parties
from correcting the errors generated by New Formalist approaches.
In short, one of the core presumptions that motivates the efficiency
rationale of New Formalism is undermined by Establishment Clause
Creep.
Accordingly, we advance a limited case for contextualism, which
will enable courts to take the commercial context into account when
resolving disputes among co-religionists. This contextualist approach
offers an antidote to the dual onslaughts of New Formalism and
Establishment Clause Creep, ensuring that co-religionists can enjoy
both the legal support necessary to sustain their commercial
endeavors and the freedom to adhere to their religious principles
without suffering commercial hardship. Contextualism is necessitated
in these limited situations by the inability of co-religionists to
translate religious terms into secular analogs and thus leverage
183
private law’s dynamism like other commercial parties.
A limited and narrowly circumscribed embrace of contextualism
would resolve the unusual legal challenges of co-religionist
commerce. First, contextualism would curtail the encroachment of
Establishment Clause Creep by discouraging courts from simply
conflating co-religious commerce with its religious context.
Contextualism instead encourages factfinders to admit contextual
evidence to inform the interpretation and enforcement of commercial
instruments. Factfinders thus would be able to inquire into the unique
commercial and social environment from which co-religionist
commerce arises. When parties suffer from purely economic torts or
have intended to draft enforceable commercial agreements,
contextualism encourages courts to be sensitive in differentiating the
commercial elements of an agreement from its ecclesiastical context,
thereby ensuring that the Establishment Clause does not
184
unnecessarily void co-religionist commercial agreements.
Second, in contrast to New Formalism’s priority on text and
outward manifestations, contextualism encourages courts to consider
the parties’ shared norms, expectations, and intentions when
183. To be sure, our limited embrace of contextualism is not a religion-specific rule. The
justification for increased contextualism is based upon the inability of the parties to modify their
agreements to surmount legal doctrines that undermine enforceability. In this way, the use of
contextualism is triggered by wholly secular considerations and is not restricted based upon the
religious nature of the commercial context in question.
184. See supra Part III.A.
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interpreting and enforcing co-religionist commercial agreements. The
very nature of co-religionist commerce suggests that careful
evaluation of context will frequently lead courts to different
conclusions. For example, contextual inquiry may in some cases
reveal that documents that facially appear to be commercial
instruments were instead intended by the parties to serve as religious
symbols and were drafted as part of traditional religious
185
ceremonies. In other cases, contextual inquiry may provide a basis
to interpret seemingly religious terminology, thus allowing
enforcement without encroaching on Establishment Clause
prohibitions. In this way, contextualism can further ensure the
enforceability of co-religionist commerce by avoiding Establishment
Clause pitfalls, using the norms and understandings shared by coreligionists to fill in gaps and interpret terms in co-religionist
commercial agreements.
Because co-religionist commerce offers a narrow—but growing—
instance in which the presumptions of New Formalism do not hold, a
narrow—but meaningful—exception to formalist adjudication would
mitigate the twin constraints this Article identifies. A limited
contextualist correction would merely require courts to consider
whether the contracting environment and the social norms of the
commercial parties are such that formalist interpretation leads to an
incorrect result. A healthy dose of contextualism might help courts
navigate their way between New Formalism and Establishment
Clause Creep, providing co-religionist commerce with the
adjudicative infrastructure it needs to remain viable.
Fortunately, some courts have resisted rigid formalist analysis of
co-religionist commercial disputes and have illustrated how
contextualism can resolve co-religionist disputes. The remainder of
this Part shows how courts can use limited contextualism to
adjudicate cases fairly and accurately while maintaining a fidelity to
the Religion Clauses.

185. As described above, examples of this phenomenon include documents related to
religious marriage and divorce—such as the Jewish ketubah and the Islamic mahr agreement—
as well as documents that temporarily shift ownership over commercial goods or enterprises in
order to account for religious rules and requirements. See supra Part III.B.
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A. Disentangling Co-Religionist Commerce from Co-Religionist
Context
Establishment Clause Creep is predominantly a product of the
judicial failure to differentiate between the substantive content of
religious agreements and their surrounding context. In some
circumstances, however, courts have approached co-religionist
commercial instruments with surgical precision, carefully extracting
secular contract terms from their surrounding religious context. In
186
Light v. Light, for example, a Connecticut court enforced a standard
187
prenuptial agreement drafted by a prominent rabbinical court —the
188
Beth Din of America. The goal of the Beth Din’s prenuptial
agreements is to provide the wife with financial leverage to obtain a
189
Jewish divorce. Since traditional Jewish law grants the husband
190
unilateral authority to initiate a divorce, the so-called “Jewish
191
prenup” emerged after creative drafting on the part of lawyers and

186. Light v. Light, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2967 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2012).
187. See Binding Arbitration Agreement, BETH DIN OF AM., http://theprenup.org/pdf/
Prenup_Standard.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2015) (providing a boilerplate version of an updated
prenuptial agreement).
188. For a discussion of the innovations of the Beth Din of America and of the potential
lessons to be gleaned from these innovations, see generally Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Law
Courts in America: Lessons Offered to Sharia Courts by the Beth Din of America Precedent, 57
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 287 (2013).
189. See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 121, at 365 (affirming this sentiment).
190. This asymmetry has long been an issue of concern within the Jewish community and
has been the topic of significant scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Breitowitz, supra note 121, at
320–21 (analyzing this balance); Estin, supra note 57, at 566 (same); Greenawalt, supra note 15,
at 812 (same); Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces
of Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 405–08 (2000) (same); Suzanne
Last Stone, The Intervention of American Law in Jewish Divorce: A Pluralist Analysis, 34 ISR. L.
REV. 170, 175–78 (2000) (same).
In response to these issues, New York has famously adopted two “Get Statutes,” which
authorize courts to account for a husband’s failure to provide his wife with a Jewish divorce
document when they grant secular divorces and divide marital assets. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 253 (McKinney 2010); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236B(5)(h), (6)(d) (McKinney 2010). See Lisa
Zornberg, Beyond the Constitution: Is the New York Get Legislation Good Law?, 15 PACE L.
REV. 703, 706–07 (1995) (discussing the purpose behind this legislation).
191. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Enforcing the “Jewish Prenup”, CTR. FOR L. & RELIGION
F. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://clrforum.org/2013/03/29/enforcing-the-jewish-prenup; Hannah Scholl,
Estee Goldschmidt & Marc Herman, Insisting on a Jewish Prenup, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD
(Mar. 21, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://blogs.forward.com/sisterhood-blog/153359/insisting-on-ajewish-prenup.
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rabbis to prevent husbands from using this authority as leverage
192
during the course of dissolving their marriages.
Although this form prenuptial agreement is intended to
counteract an inequity in Jewish divorce law, the document itself
intentionally avoids importing religious terminology or criteria. The
key provision in these religious prenuptial agreements is the “support
provision,” which requires the husband to pay his wife $100 per day in
the event the couple “do[es] not continue domestic residence
together for whatever reason . . . from the day [the couple] no longer
continue[s] domestic residence together, and for the duration of [the
193
couple’s] Jewish marriage . . . .” Thus, the longer the husband
refuses to provide his wife with a Jewish divorce document, the larger
194
his debt grows.
The husband in Light sought to have the court invalidate his
prenuptial agreement on the ground that enforcing such an
agreement violated the Establishment Clause. He argued that “the
prenuptial agreement refers to and reflects religious doctrine,
protocols and ceremonies” and therefore should not be enforced by a
195
civil court. Nonetheless, the court proceeded to carefully separate
the agreement from its religious context, stating:
In the present case, a determination as to whether the prenuptial
agreement is enforceable would not require the court to delve into
religious issues. Determining whether the defendant owes the
plaintiff the specified sum of money does not require the court to
evaluate the proprieties of religious teachings. Rather, the relief
sought by the plaintiff is simply to compel the defendant to perform
a secular obligation, i.e., spousal support payments, to which he
196
contractually bound himself.

Commentators have noted that the court’s decision—and its careful
attention to disentangling contractual terms from their religious
context—offers significant hope for various forms of co-religionist
192. See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 121, at 375–78 (discussing the development of
Jewish prenuptial agreements); Rabbinic Endorsements, THE PRENUP, http://theprenup.org/
rabbinic.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
193. Light v. Light, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2967, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2012).
194. See Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980, 991 (Md. App. 2011) (enforcing a religious arbitration
award which modified the amount due pursuant to a Jewish prenuptial agreement); Mordechai
Willig, The Prenuptial Agreement: Recent Developments, 1 J. BETH DIN OF AM. 8, 14–15 (2012)
(further discussing marital negotiations in this context).
195. Light, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2967, at *6–7 .
196. Id. at *19.
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commerce going forward. Certainly, the decision in Light offers the
possibility that parties entering into a religious marriage can structure
their legal obligations with the help of secular, court-enforced
198
instruments. The ruling thus validates the use of state-enforced legal
instruments as a response to problematic religious doctrine that fails
199
to address the contemporary needs of a religious community. In this
way, the prenuptial agreement is emblematic of how religious
communities can employ commercial instruments to achieve religious
objectives. But Light also illustrates that these agreements are not
self-enforcing, and the authority of public courts is necessary to
effectuate their purpose.
Indeed, this dynamic captures the core rationale behind the
Supreme Court’s endorsement of the neutral-principles doctrine,
which “shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general—
flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the
200
intentions of the parties.” Thus, the promise of the neutralprinciples doctrine—to empower religious communities to use private
legal instruments to organize their affairs—can only be realized to the
extent courts avoid erroneously conflating a religious context with
secular elements of an agreement. Put differently, to capitalize on
what the neutral-principles approach can provide co-religionist
commerce, courts must beat back Establishment Clause Creep and
recognize that just because a legal instrument emerges from a
religious context does not mean that its enforcement requires ruling
on religious doctrine.
B. Employing Co-Religionist Context to Interpret Co-Religionist
Commerce
A commitment to contextualism encourages courts to recognize
that sophisticated application of the neutral-principles approach is
197. Paul Berger, In Victory for ‘Chained’ Wives, Court Upholds Orthodox Prenuptial
Agreement, THE FORWARD (Feb. 15, 2013), available at http://forward.com/articles/170721/invictory-for-chained-wives-court-upholds-o/?p=all#ixzz2NwAbHtuu; Sam Sokol, U.S. Court
Validates Halachic Prenuptial Agreement, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://
www.jpost.com/JewishWorld/JewishNews/Article.aspx?id=302836.
198. Berger, supra note 197 (quoting Susan Aranoff, director of the advocacy group Agunah
International, as noting that the “unanswered question with regard to the prenup was always
will it be enforceable in civil court”).
199. Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Wise Embrace of Commerce, FIRST THINGS “ON THE
SQUARE” (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2013/02/religionrsquos-wiseembrace-of-commerce.
200. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979).
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necessary for the continued viability of co-religionist commerce.
Thus, courts should focus on enforceable neutral principles when
parties intentionally draft co-religionist commercial agreements using
secular terms and should not deny access to court enforcement by
overextending the constitutional prohibition against resolving
religious questions. But, just as courts must avoid erroneously
triggering constitutional prohibitions, they must also be sensitive to
the religious context of particular agreements. Even when an
instrument or conduct appears devoid of ecclesiastical content, courts
must nonetheless use contextualism to understand and adjudicate coreligionist disputes.
Some courts have successfully employed contextualist
approaches to ensure that co-religionist agreements were enforced in
a manner that reflected the shared intentions of the parties. One of
the most notable examples has been a series of cases addressing heter
iska (literally, “permissible venture”) agreements, which restructure
loans as joint ventures to avoid Jewish law’s prohibition against
201
usury. Accordingly, the intended borrower, instead of simply
agreeing to pay interest, promises to pay a rate of return on an
“investment,” typically capped at a rate equal to the intended interest
202
rate. Although sometimes such heter iska agreements will be
executed as the sole agreement between the parties, they are often
executed alongside other documents—anything from a standard loan
203
agreement to mortgage documents. This device, introduced into the
Jewish commercial markets sometime between the twelfth and
fourteenth centuries, enables market participants to grant interestbearing loans—but under a different name—thereby technically
204
avoiding charging interest in violation of Jewish law. At bottom,
201. Steven H. Resnicoff, A Commercial Conundrum: Does Prudence Permit the Jewish
“Permissible Venture”?, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 80–85 (1989); see generally Jay M. Zitter,
Application, Recognition, or Consideration of Jewish Law by Courts in United States, 81
A.L.R.6th 1 (2013) (discussing this claim).
202. 2 J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 376–85 (1983) (discussing
the Jewish legal background to heter iska agreements); see also YISROEL REISMAN, THE LAWS
OF RIBBIS 377–407 (1994) (providing further analysis of the Jewish-law rules applicable to the
heter iska).
203. See, e.g., Edelkind v. Fairmont Funding, Ltd., 539 F. Supp. 2d 449, 452 (D. Mass. 2007)
(executing a heter iska agreement alongside mortgage documents); Heimbinder v. Berkovitz,
175 Misc. 2d 808, 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (executing a heter iska agreement alongside loan
documents); Barclay Commerce Corp. v. Finkelstein, 11 A.D.2d 327, 328 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960)
(executing a heter iska agreement alongside a factoring agreement).
204. See Leibovici v. Rawicki, 290 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (Civ. Ct. 1968) (“‘Hetter Isske’ or
[]heter ‘iska’ was a device developed in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries to overcome the
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these agreements are best understood as religiously sanctioned
loopholes to avoid religious rules against charging interest, and do not
represent the parties’ mutual assent to adopt contractual
205
obligations.
Not surprisingly, courts have been asked on occasion to interpret
such heter iska agreements in instances in which the borrower’s
206
venture has failed and the creditor would like his loan repaid. In
such circumstances, the borrower will frequently cite the heter iska
agreement and argue that because the creditor bore the risk that the
venture would fail, there is no remaining debt under the terms of the
207
agreement.
By and large, formalism has not lured courts into enforcing heter
208
iska agreements. To the contrary, courts have employed a variety of
antiformalist tactics to demonstrate that the parties intended only to
satisfy a religious formality and never intended these agreements to
209
be contractually binding. In so doing, courts have emphasized the

biblical prohibition against charging interest by one Jew to another.”); see also BLEICH, supra
note 202, at 376–85 (discussing the Jewish legal background to heter iska agreements). For
examples of such agreements, see id. at 385–88 (providing boilerplate heter iska agreements for
use in different commercial contexts); REISMAN, supra note 202, at 419–24 (same). Heter iska
agreements typically incorporate heightened evidentiary requirements to prove the venture’s
losses, and are intended to prevent the borrower from avoiding his obligation to pay the lender.
See id. at 377–407 (1994).
205. See, e.g., Bollag v. Dresdner, 495 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1985) (citing Lester v.
Levick 376 N.Y.S.2d 619 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)) (noting in the context of a heter iska
agreement that “[a] transaction must be considered in its totality and judged by its real
character, rather than by the name, color, or form which the parties assign to it”).
206. See, e.g., Barclay Commerce Corp., 11 A.D.2d at 327 (attempting to avoid payment of
outstanding debts on the basis of a heter iska agreement).
207. Id.
208. Mahmoud A. El-Gama, Incoherence of Contract-Based Islamic Financial Jurisprudence
in the Age of Financial Engineering, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 605, 606 (2008) (noting that courts have
“dismissed the religious-legal characterization of the [heter iska] contract as investment agency
in favor of treating it as typical interest-based debt”).
209. See, e.g., Edelkind, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (accepting a recommendation for the
dismissal of claims involving a heter iska agreement based on a lack of standing); Leibovici, 290
N.Y.S.2d at 1000–01 (concluding that the court was not bound by the heter iska agreement);
Arnav Indus., Inc. v. Westside Realty Assoc., 180 A.D.2d 463 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (failing to
recognize the existence of a separate heter iska partnership, though a promissory note was
explicitly written to be in accordance with heter iska); Barclay Commerce Corp., 11 A.D.2d at
327 (concluding that the heter iska agreement was “merely a compliance in form with Hebraic
law”); VNB N.Y. Corp. v. 47 Lynbrook LLC, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 364 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11,
2012) (concluding that the heter iska agreement did not alter the terms of a note and a
mortgage).
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contractual background of heter iska agreements, often emphasizing
their factual context to infer the true intent of the parties.
210
For example, in Heimbeinder v. Berkowitz, the court refused to
enforce a heter iska agreement after taking into consideration a
variety of contextual factors, including that the defendant had
produced the agreement from his pocket at the conclusion of the
211
closing, and that the plaintiff admitted that the defendant had
executed the heter iska agreement simply “because under Jewish law
212
he was ‘not supposed to be charged interest.’” The court concluded
that the heter iska agreement was not intended to be enforceable, but
213
“was ‘merely a compliance in form with Hebraic law.’” Other courts
have followed suit, recognizing that just because the form of the heter
iska resembles a true contract, the context of such agreements clearly
indicated that the parties did not intend them as enforceable legal
214
instruments.
Contextualism can also prove useful in enforcing commercial
elements of the mahr agreement that were intended to be enforced.
215
216
In Ahmed v. Ahmed, a dispute over a mahr agreement, the
plaintiff—the defendant’s ex-wife—had been awarded $50,000 by the
trial court pursuant to the terms of the mahr agreement. The key
provision of the agreement stated that the parties “have been
united . . . in matrimony as husband and wife against a Mahr of
$50,000 of which prompt payment is nil and deferred payment is
217
$50,000.” The defendant argued on appeal that the agreement was
218
simply “‘too vague and uncertain to be enforced’” since it failed to
210. Heimbinder v. Berkovitz, 175 Misc. 2d 808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
211. Id. at 817.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Edelkind, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (citation omitted) (“In civil courts, Shtar Heter
Iska agreements have been interpreted as ‘merely a compliance in form with Hebraic law,’ that
does not create a partnership between the parties, and that causes of action based on an attempt
to create obligations out of such an agreement are ‘devoid of merit.’”); Arnav Indus., Inc., 180
A.D.2d at 464 (holding that the plaintiff’s claims predicated on a heter iska agreement creating
a partnership were “devoid of merit”); Barclay Commerce Corp., 11 A.D.2d at 328 (“The
plaintiff explained the purpose of the ‘Heter Iska’ as being merely a compliance in form with
Hebraic law, but did not create a partnership or intend to create one and its explanation of the
‘Heter Iska’ and its purpose is not contradicted by the defendants . . . .”); see also Leibovici, 290
N.Y.S.2d at 1000 (finding that the parties did not intend to enforce the agreement).
215. Ahmed v. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App. 2008).
216. Id. at 190.
217. Id. at 195.
218. Id.
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state who was meant to pay whom, when it would be paid or how it
219
was to be paid.
But the court resisted such a purely formalist approach, choosing
instead to treat the mahr as an incomplete document that required
further evidence to interpret and enforce. The court also avoided
ruling on what a mahr contract required as a matter of religious
doctrine, which might have been a constitutionally problematic
approach. Instead, the court simply zeroed in on the subjective intent
of the parties. The court thereby leveraged the parties’ shared
understanding of the mahr agreement to fill in the perceived gaps in
the document:
Both parties were raised in the Islamic faith, and Afreen [the
plaintiff] testified that the Mahr agreement is a contract based on
Islamic custom and religious principles. Amir [the defendant]
offered no testimony regarding the Mahr, but Afreen explained that
the Mahr constitutes a promise of an amount to be paid to the bride
and if not given before, it must be given at the time of a divorce. If
credited by the trial court as factfinder, this evidence establishes that
the parties understood their agreement and that the terms are
220
sufficiently specific to be enforced.

Importantly, the court did not admit the wife’s testimony as objective
evidence of the religious doctrine at stake in the mahr contract;
rather, the court relied on her testimony as evidence of the shared
221
subjective understanding of the parties. In this way, the court
explicitly embraced a contextual approach, stating that it “may look
to the relationship between the parties and the circumstances
surrounding the contract to determine if the terms were sufficiently
222
definite for the parties to understand their obligations.”

219. Id. (“Amir contends this language is too vague to be enforceable because it does not
explain who would make the payment and when and how it would be paid.”); see Appellant’s
Brief, Ahmed v. Ahmed, No. 14-07-00008, at *13–15 (June 7, 2007) (arguing that the mahr
agreement was too vague to be enforced). For the full text of the agreement, see id. at *2.
Several have also claimed that mahr agreements often lack the requisite specificity and
certainty to warrant enforcement. See, e.g., Blenkhorn, supra note 56, at 210–18 (arguing that
the uncertain terms of many mahr contracts should preclude their enforcement).
220. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d at 195 (emphasis added).
221. Id. (“If credited by the trial court as factfinder, this evidence establishes that the parties
understood their agreement and that the terms are sufficiently specific to be enforced.”
(emphasis added)).
222. Id.
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A similar contextual approach convinced a Washington state
court to refuse to enforce a mahr agreement. In In re the Marriage of
223
the court concluded that the defendant lacked any
Obaidi,
understanding of the agreement, emphasizing a variety of contextual
considerations, including that the defendant did not read Farsi (the
language in which the mahr agreement had been drafted), had not
heard of the mahr contract until the day of his wedding, and had
224
signed the agreement only at the behest of his mother. These
contextual considerations convinced the court that for this couple, the
mahr was merely a ritual formality and did not constitute any
225
contractual assent.
While reaching different outcomes, the state courts in both
Ahmed and In re the Marriage of Obaidi focused on the parties’
subjective intents in deciding whether to enforce a mahr agreement.
Their contextual approaches illustrate how courts can resolve coreligionist
commercial
disputes
without
encroaching
on
Establishment Clause concerns. This contextual approach allows
private law to work its “genius” among co-religionists as it does
among all parties.
CONCLUSION
This Article explores the existential threat to co-religionist
commerce that is being produced by two separate doctrinal
developments. New Formalism instructs courts to resist considering
contextual evidence and relational principles that might illuminate
the contracting parties’ shared intent and understandings. And
Establishment Clause Creep has caused courts to be increasingly
reluctant to enforce agreements situated within a religious context.
The combination has expanded the scope of cases between coreligionists that result in judicial abstention, rendering contracts
unenforceable and removing protections from economic torts.
Consequently, plaintiffs have been left to absorb commercial harms
without an avenue for judicial remedy, and the viability of coreligionist commerce has become uncertain.
The impact of these developments has been vast. They threaten
the sustainability of multi-billion-dollar markets, and they encroach

223. In re the Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
224. Id. at 788–89.
225. Id. at 791–92.
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upon important and intimate dealings in multiple religious
communities in the United States. They also limit the ability of
religiously devout individuals to use legal instruments to order their
affairs and transact with community members in manners consistent
with their faith. Thus, zealous Establishment Clause jurisprudence
has combined with formalistic commercial law to, paradoxically, limit
religious free expression. Understanding co-religionist commerce
reveals just how central commercial dealings are to co-religionist
relationships and religious life and how religious expression
frequently relies upon judicial intervention, not judicial restraint.
Religion Clause jurisprudence has not fully appreciated how rulings
aimed at protecting religious practice from state intrusion can instead
undermine religious dealings between community members, and
commercial law has not appreciated (at all) that co-religionist
commerce offers an unusual category of transactions in which the
logic underlying formalism does not apply.
This Article suggests a limited embrace of contextualism as a
solution. By leveraging shared subjective intent, religious norms, and
communal understandings, courts can selectively navigate the
doctrinal minefields that cause courts to misunderstand or neglect
commercial disputes and can provide a more stable adjudicative
infrastructure for co-religionist commerce. Contextualism has its own
rich history in both contract and tort law, and this very circumscribed
invocation can correct some unintended and undesirable excesses of
combining New Formalism with Establishment Clause Creep. Failing
to adopt this contextualist correction will add to the uncertainty that
currently plagues co-religionist commerce and will undermine the
ability of individuals to simultaneously pursue their religious and
commercial objectives. Indeed, if both public law and private law
continue on their current trajectory, there is good reason to believe
that the foundations of co-religionist commerce will not hold much
longer, and that the price of participating in commercial markets will
be that parties must check their religion at the door.

